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Holding Health Insurance Marketplaces
Accountable: The Unheralded Rise and Imminent
Demise of Structural Reform Litigation in
Health Care
Sarah L. Grusin, J.D.
I. INTRODUCTION

Legal scholars have become increasingly interested in how to ensure accountability in the face of divided government authority. One area of
thought focuses on the division of authority between federal and state actors.1 Another important area focuses on the increasing number of private
entities responsible for public functions.2 The new health insurance system
established by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA") divides authority for providing health insurance to low- and middle-income
individuals along both dimensions at once.3 With the introduction of the
Health Insurance Marketplaces ("Marketplaces"), the system for administering health insurance and tax credits now utilizes a complex web of federal agencies, federal-state partnership entities, state agencies, state quasigovernmental organizations, and private contractors.4 Questions of accountability in the Marketplaces will pose new problems that are complicated by this heavily divided authority.
Problematically, the traditional mechanisms used to create accountability
within the Medicaid program will not translate cleanly into this new system.
A typical Medicaid enforcement suit involves a 28 U.S.C. § 1983 claim,
which allows individuals to enforce their statutory rights against an individYale Law School, Juris Doctor 2014. Law clerk to the Hon. Rebecca Pallmeyer. This arti-

cle represents solely the author's views. I would like to thank Professors Nicholas Parrillo
and Abbe Gluck for guidance while developing this paper. Thanks also to Christine Monahan for sharing her extensive expertise and positive attitude.
1.
See Abbe R. Gluck, InstrastatutoryFederalism and Statutory Interpretation:State
Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534 (2011);
see also Josh Bendor & Miles Farmer, Curing the Blind Spot in Administrative Law: A Federal Common Law Framework for State Agencies Implementing Cooperative Federalism
Statutes, 122 YALE L.J. 1280 (2013).
2.
See, e.g., GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
(Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009).
3.
See infra Section II.A.

4.

See infra Section IV.C.
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ual acting under color of state law.5 But enforcement against the Marketplaces will not be able to take this form. The current doctrine governing the
obligations of quasi-private and quasi-state entities relies on bright-line distinctions between state and federal actors and public and private actors.6
Such blunt instruments result in significant inconsistencies in the stateaction doctrine. These inconsistencies will be more acute when evaluating
the state-run Marketplaces, because each one has a slightly different governance structure, with many delegating authority to non-profit or quasigovernmental entities.8 This article tackles the broad question of who is,
and who should be, responsible for ensuring that the new Marketplaces-in
all of their various forms-comply with federal laws and regulations.
This inquiry necessarily implicates the role of federal agencies in administering cooperative-federalism programs. 9 The implementing federal agency, in this case primarily the Department of Health and Human Services
("HHS"), 0 might seem like the obvious choice to enforce the statute and
regulations. However, this article argues that given the history of weak federal agency enforcement in Medicaid, 1 HHS is extremely unlikely to enforce federal law against the Marketplaces. Instead, private enforcement
will be necessary to ensure that the rights of applicants and beneficiaries of
the Marketplaces are protected.
Therefore, this article wades into the large debate over the use of private

5.
28 U.S.C. § 1983. See infra Section II.B.
6.
See infra Section IV.C.
7.
Id.
8.
Id.; see also infra Appendix.
9.
"Cooperative federalism" refers the broad category of federal programs where state
governments participate in administering and implementing the federal policy. See Michael
S. Greve, Against Cooperative Federalism, 70 Miss. L.J. 557, 558 (2000). The Supreme
Court recognized the trend towards cooperative-federalism programs in Maine v. Thiboutot,)
when it noted the "literally hundreds of cooperative regulatory and special welfare enactments," in which "[s]tates now participate in the enforcement of federal laws." 448 U.S. 1,
22-23 (1980). For a more nuanced discussion of the myriad variants on cooperativefederalism see Abbe R. Gluck, IntrastatutoryFederalismand Statutory Interpretation:State
Implementation of FederalLaw in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L. J. 534 (2011).
10.
See Timothy Jost, Implementing Health Reform: Little Rulemaking, But A Steady
Stream Of Guidance & A Streamlined Application, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Apr. 30, 2013),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2013/04/30/implementing-health-reform-little-rulemaking-buta-steady-stream-of-guidance/ (describing implementing agencies "the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS) of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the
Department of Labor, and the Department of Treasury."); see also Katherine Hayes et al.,
ACA Policy Implementation: A Snapshot of Key Developments and What Lies Ahead,
HEALTHREFoRMGPS (Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.healthreformgps.org/resources/aca-policyimplementation-a-snapshot-of-key-developments-and-what-lies-ahead/ (describing the Department of Health and Human Services-or the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
and Center for Consumer Information and Oversight which are housed within HHS-as the
implementing agency for 15 of 16 major areas of the Affordable Care Act).
11.
See infra Section II.A.
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enforcement through structural reform litigation, as opposed to public enforcement through federal agencies. Although there is a robust literature
documenting, theorizing, and often criticizing, the use of structural reform
litigation, 1 2 the rise of structural reform litigation in health law, and specifically in Medicaid, has been largely overlooked.13 In Section II, this article
fills that gap by tracing the relationship between HHS, the states, and private litigants in enforcing federal Medicaid requirements. HHS has vocally
and consistently supported the use of private enforcement to ensure state
compliance with federal law, in large part because agency enforcement is
infeasible. 14 As a result of private enforcement, structural reform litigation
has helped create an important floor in the Medicaid program-ensuring
due process protections and access to healthcare benefits-through a nationwide network of district court orders. 15 These court orders have also
spurred state legislation modeled on injunctions and consent decrees. 16 Examining structural reform litigation within Medicaid thus provides a unique
perspective on the relationship between structural reform litigation and fed-

12.

See, e.g., Ross SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT

HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT (2003); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm M. Feeley,
JudicialPolicy Making and Litigation Against the Government, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 617
(2002); David Zaring, National Rulemaking Through Trial Courts: The Big Case and Institutional Reform, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1015 (2004); Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Politics of Consent: Party Incentives in Institutional Reform Consent Decrees, in CONSENT AND ITS
DISCONTENTS: POLICY ISSUES INCONSENT DECREES 13, 16-18 (Andrew Rachlin ed., 2006).
13.
Although there is a healthy literature describing and criticizing how private enforcement of Medicaid is contracting in the wake of changes in Supreme Court precedent,
these articles typically start from the assumption that private enforcement is important, without systematically analyzing the role litigation has played in shaping the program. See, e.g.,
Nicole Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle: The Spending Clause, Section 1983, and Medicaid
Entitlements, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 413, 416-18 (2008) (discussing the changes in Medicaid enforcement that are likely to occur after Gonzaga and noting briefly the "sheer quantity of lower federal court cases" enforcing Medicaid rights); Jon Donenberg, Medicaid and
Beneficiary Enforcement: Maintaining State Compliance with FederalAvailability Requirements, 117 YALE L.J. 1498, 1516-17 (2008) (noting initially that § 1983 is primary mechanism for enforcing Medicaid and analyzing Supreme Court precedent limiting the cause of
action); Rochelle Bobroff, Section 1983 and Preemption:Alternative Means of Court Access
for Safety Net Statutes, 10 LoY. J. PUB. INT. L. 27, 34 (2008) (describing the Supremacy
Clause as an alternative to § 1983 suits given the limitations on § 1983 imposed by the Supreme Court). There are also a handful of articles written by practitioners or students that
catalogue the various trends in litigation enforcing particular Medicaid provisions. See Margaret K. Feltz, Playing the Lottery: HCBS Lawsuits and Other MedicaidLitigation on Behalf
of the Developmentally Disabled, 12 HEALTH MATRIX 181, 187 (2002); see also Jane Perkins & Randolph T. Boyle, Symposium: Addressing Long Waits for Home and CommunityBased Care Through Medicaid and the ADA, 45 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 117, 118 (2001). Yet none
of these articles have analyzed the role that private enforcement plays in the Medicaid program as a whole or situated private enforcement in Medicaid within the broader literature
regarding the efficacy of structural reform litigation.
14.
See infra Section II.A.
15.
See id.
16.
See id.
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eral agency enforcement.
In Section III, this article analyzes the need for the same type of structural reform litigation in the Marketplaces. Indeed, HHS seems eager to take a
parallel approach. 17 Although the text of the ACA itself is quite vague,
HHS's stated policy is a "no wrong door" approach, so that applicants receive the same eligibility determination and procedural protections no matter whether they apply with a Medicaid agency or a Marketplace. 18 This
suggests that HHS would prefer that Marketplace applicants be able to enforce their rights against non-compliant Marketplaces, just as Medicaid
beneficiaries have done against non-compliant Medicaid agencies. But the
current law of § 1983 cuts the agency's policy preferences out of the equation. Instead, the doctrine focuses on statutory text, imagining a relationship
only between Congress and state officials.1 9 The result of courts' excessive
emphasis on congressional intent is that regulations, where the due process
protections for the Marketplaces are located, may not be able to create
rights enforceable through § 1983. In Section IV, this article discusses these
additional barriers that actors bringing suit against the Marketplaces will
face, which are not present in the Medicaid context. 20 Finally, this article
suggests that the law of § 1983 should acknowledge the more nuanced relationships that exist between federal agencies, state officials, and beneficiaries by recognizing delegations of rights-making authority to agencies for
the purposes of § 1983.
II. STRUCTURAL REFORM LITIGATION IN MEDICAID
A. The Role of StructuralReform Litigation in Shaping Medicaid

Private enforcement litigation has played an important role in shaping
the Medicaid program. Since its enactment in 1965, Medicaid has evolved
into the principal source of health insurance for low-income individuals and
individuals with extensive health care needs. 21 Today, Medicaid provides
health and long-term care services for sixty-six million low-income people. 22 The states and federal government jointly fund Medicaid. 23 The fed17.
18.
19.
20.

See infra Section III.
Id.
See infra Sections IV.A-B.
See id.

21.
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., FEDERAL CORE REQUIREMENTS AND STATE OPTIONS IN
MEDICAID: CURRENT POLICIES AND KEY ISSUES 1 (2011) [hereinafter FEDERAL CORE

REQUIREMENTS], available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01
/8174.pdf.
22.
VERNON K. SMITH ET AL., MEDICAID IN A HISTORIC TIME OF TRANSFORMATION,
KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 7 (2013), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.
com/2013/10/8498-medicaid-in-a-historic-time-of-transformation.pdf.
Specifically, Medicaid covers thirty-two million children, eighteen million adults, and sixteen million elderly
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eral government provides matching funds for qualified state expenditures,
and these matching Medicaid funds comprise the largest share of federal
revenues to states. 24 In exchange for these funds, federal statutes and regulations establish minimum requirements for state Medicaid programs including "mandatory" populations to cover and mandatory benefits. However, beyond these minimum requirements, states have significant
flexibility to make choices about who qualifies for coverage, what additional benefits to cover, and how to fund and deliver medical services. 26 States
must submit their plans to the federal agency, the Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services ("CMS") within HHS, for approval. 2 In order to implement policy changes that deviate from federal requirements, states must
seek approval from CMS for a "waiver" from these federal requirements. 28
The Secretary of HHS has the authority to approve waivers so long as the
waiver "is likely to assist in promoting the objectives" of the Medicaid
Act 29 ("Act"). 30 In addition to reviewing state plans, CMS collects data to
monitor how federal funds are spent.3 1
1. HHS Oversight is Insufficient to Ensure Compliance with the Federal
Medicaid Statute
This federal agency oversight, however, has been insufficient to ensure
that states comply with federal requirements or that low-income individuals
receive and maintain adequate access to health care. HHS has limited authority to enforce the statutes and regulations governing state Medicaid
programs; the only remedy available to HHS is withholding some or all of
the federal matching payments until the state remedies the violation.32

and people with disabilities. Id.

23.
24.

FEDERAL CORE REQUIREMENTS,

25.

42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(10) (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 113-174).

26.
27.

FEDERAL CORE REQUIREMENTS,

28.

Id. at 3.

SMITH ET AL., supra note

supra note 21, at 1.
22, at 8.
supra note 21, at 2.

Id.

29. Medicaid was enacted as Title XIX of the Social Security Act, but is also known as
the Medicaid Act. See, e.g., Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 501 (1990).
30.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1315(a) (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 113-174); accord
FEDERAL CORE REQUIREMENTS, supra note 21, at 3.
31.
FEDERAL CORE REQUIREMENTS, supra note 21, at 3.
32.
42 U.S.C. § 1396c (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 113-174) (stating the Secretary has the discretion to limit payments "to categories under or parts of the State plan not
affected by" the state's noncompliance). Although in National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius, the Supreme Court found that the application of the remedy in § 1396c
to the Medicaid expansion population unconstitutional, the decision was limited to the Medicaid expansion population (adults with incomes under 133% of the Federal Poverty Level).
Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012) ("the Secretary [of
HHS] cannot apply § 1396c to withdraw existing Medicaid funds for failure to comply with
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However, this remedy is drastic because it would result in dangerously low
levels of care for Medicaid beneficiaries.3 3 Beneficiaries seeking greater
benefits or providers seeking higher reimbursement rates are unlikely to request federal agency enforcement if the only solution is to further cripple
the program.34 Because this enforcement tool is so drastic, it has never been

used. 5 Given this structure of agency enforcement, "states act first and seek
permission later," and run no risk of losing state funds.36 Even if HHS was
willing to use such a drastic remedy, its statutory authority to enforce certain provisions is often limited.3 7 For example, in the context of provider
reimbursements rates, HHS must approve the state plan so long as the state
has provided adequate assurances that the payment amounts are sufficient
to attract providers.3 8 But the Secretary is only required to look at the assurances; there is no requirement that states even present the data that support
those assurances. 39
In addition to limited enforcement powers, HHS lacks the capacity and
resources to effectively monitor state compliance.4 0 Private enforcement
encourages the individuals who are harmed to identify violations for the
agency.41 Without private enforcement, it might be hard for HHS to identify
the requirements set out in the expansion.") HHS still maintains this remedy to enforce other
program requirements that were in place previously. Id. ("Today's holding does not affect
the continued application of §1396c to the existing Medicaid program."); see also Steven
Clark, At Risk Patients and Doctors: Why IncreasedAgency Enforcement and Private Causes of Action Under the Supremacy Clause are Needed to Protect Medicaid Providers and
Beneficiaries, 101 Ky. L.J. 183, 203 (2012-2013) (asserting that if a state fails to comply
with federal Medicaid requirements "the federal government's only remedies would be to
seek an injunction in federal court or to terminate Medicaid funding to the state altogether.").
33.
See Donenberg, supra note 13, at 1501 (the remedy is so destructive to the underlying aid program that it is rarely, if ever, invoked) (internal quotations omitted).
34.
See Sasha Samberg-Champion, How to Read Gonzaga: Laying the Seeds of a Coherent Section 1983 Jurisprudence, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1838, 1839 (2003).
35.
Clark, supra note 32, at 203 ("completely cutting a state off from Medicaid funding
would be a drastic measure, one that the federal government has never taken"); Sara Rosenbaum, EqualAccess for Medicaid Beneficiaries The Supreme Court and the Douglas Cases, 365 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2245, 2247 (2011) ("Cutting off federal funding is unheard of,
even when the state action is deemed unlawful."); Donenberg, supra note 13, at 1501 (asserting that cutting off state funds for Medicaid "isso destructive to the underlying aid program that [the remedy] is 'rarely, if ever, invoked'.").
36.
Rosenbaum, supra note 35, at 2247.
37.
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a) (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 113-174) (dictating
what states must include in their state plan to receive medical assistance, which provides
boundaries for what HHS can approve).
38.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(30)(A).
39.
Clark, supra note 32, at 189.
40.
See id. at 204 (stating that CMS has limited resources, making it difficult to ensure
whether or not states are meeting their equal access obligations).
41.
Id. ("former officials stated that they welcomed and relied on private causes of action to identify states that were failing to provide adequate provider payment levels"); see
also Abigail R. Moncrieff, The Supreme Court's Assault on Litigation: Why (and How) It
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individuals who do not receive notice within the required timeframe or to
spot instances when a state refuses to cover a medically necessary service.
The agency has never received funding sufficient to fully enforce the Medicaid requirements against the states, largely because of the historic ability
of HHS to rely on private enforcement. 42 As of 2011, HHS had fewer than
five hundred employees to supervise the fifty-six Medicaid programs that
administer nearly $400 billion in federal funds every year. 43 Private enforcement is a critical way of identifying violations of the Medicaid Act
that might otherwise go unnoticed by the federal agency. Private enforcement is also critical to evaluating the state plans. The relatively few federal
employees working on enforcement focus their efforts on basic bookkeeping and lack the capacity to effectively review state plans for compliance
with federal requirements.44 In fact, CMS conducts only a cursory review of
state plans, essentially permitting state agencies to self-monitor their compliance.45 Given these limitations, HHS has consistently maintained the position that private enforcement is the "safety valve" for ensuring compliance with the requirements of the Act and is an important complement to
HHS oversight.46

The last major hurdle HHS faces to effective enforcement is political.4
Might Be Good for Health Law, 90 B. U. L. REv. 2323, 2376-77 (2010) ("Perhaps the most
relevant advantage of private litigation for present purposes is that it exposes information
about private parties' behavior - information that administrative agencies currently have a
hard time gathering and that, once revealed through litigation, can be important to executive
regulation.").
42.
Brief of Former HHS Officials as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Douglas
v. Indep. Living Cent. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012) (No. 09-958) 2011 WL
3706105, at 2 [hereinafter Brief of Former HHS Officials].
43.
Id. at 19.
44.
Id.
45.
Moncrieff, supra note 41, at 2340-41 ("CMS tends to rubber-stamp state plans and
to pass the buck to state agencies when providers and beneficiaries complain.")
46.
Brief of Former HHS Officials, supra note 42, at 16, 34 (discussing HHS's consistent position on private enforcement of provider reimbursement rates provisions of the
Medicaid Act and stating that "[P]rivate enforcement may even expand the Secretary's discretion by providing a means of ensuring state compliance with § 30(A) that is far less draconian than the administrative remedies directly available to the Secretary. This understanding has been the cornerstone of HHS policy throughout the history of the Medicaid Act, and
the prevailing view of those charged with administering the program."). The Department of
Justice recently took the opposite position arguing broadly against privately enforceable
rights for the Medicaid statute. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Douglas v. Indep. Living Cent. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012) (No. 09958), 2011 WL 2132705, at 9. HHS Secretary, Kathleen Sebelius, strongly objected to the
Department of Justice's position and made efforts to "head off [acting Solicitor General]
Katyal's opinion, and her office worked with allies outside the administration to try to get
the White House to steer the Justice Department away from taking this stand." J. Lester Feder, Calif. Medicaid Cuts Pit HHS vs. DOJ, POLITICO (June 7, 2011 4:46 AM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0611/56349.html.
47.
See Brief of Former HHS Officials, supra note 42, at 3-4 (discussing how enforce-
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The first problem is acquiring funding for enforcement activities. 4 CMS
must request enforcement funds from Congress through the annual appropriations process. 49 Funds for enforcement are classified as discretionary
spending, unlike spending on medical services, which is mandatory. 5° As a
result, it is politically unrealistic that CMS will receive sufficient funding to
enforce state noncompliance, particularly when compliance often requires
increased federal expenditures on medical services.' This also explains
why CMS currently focuses its enforcement efforts on fraud and abuse, rather than compliance with beneficiary benefits and provider rates-when
CMS uncovers fraud and abuse, it can require a state to repay the federal
funds.52
The second political problem HHS faces is its relationship with the
states. Generally, in cooperative-federalism programs, the role of federal
agencies towards states is one of a coach rather than a referee. 53 Federal
agencies are therefore
unlikely to use harsh enforcement mechanisms to enS
54
5
sure compliance. The reluctance to withhold funding is particularly acute
in the Medicaid context because, given the routine budget overruns in state
Medicaid programs, states are politically reliant on federal financial participation.55 Withholding large amounts of funding to a state is likely a politically perilous move, rendering the chances of HHS effectively enforcing
the Medicaid statute even more unlikely.56

ment of § 30(A) is politically unfeasible).
48.
See id. ("funds for the administration of Medicaid are provided by appropriation,

they are subject to far greater congressional budget restraints than Medicaid benefits").
49.
Id. at 21-22.
50.
Id. at 21.
51.
See id.
52.
Moncrieff, supra note 41, at 2341 ("CMS directs more of its Medicaid resources to
policing individual providers' compliance with Medicaid fraud and abuse laws than policing
state agencies' compliance with the federal statute. On the occasions that CMS does reject
state plans or insist on amendments thereto, it almost always does so to protect its own funds
from perceived state raids."); see also Nicole Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle: The Spending Clause, Section 1983, and Medicaid Entitlements, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 413, 465

(2008) (noting CMS's focus on fraud prevention rather than access enforcement).
53.
Edward A. Tomlinson & Jerry L. Mashaw, The Enforcement of Federal Standards
in Grant-in-Aid Programs: Suggestions for Beneficiary Involvement, 58 Va. L. Rev. 600,
620 (1972).
54.
See id.
55.
Brian J. Dunne, Enforcement of the MedicaidAct Under 42 USC § 1983 After Gonzaga University v Doe: The "DispassionateLens" Examined, 74 U. CHI L. REv. 991, 99495 (2007).
56.
Id.
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2. The History of Private Enforcement of Medicaid

Medicaid beneficiaries and providers have therefore relied on federal litigation as a complement to HHS oversight in order to secure
S 57 state compliance with the Medicaid Act and implementing regulations. Since its enactment in 1965, the substantive and procedural requirements of the
Medicaid Act have been enforced through private lawsuits. In the 1970s,
suits by providers seeking injunctive relief to increase reimbursement rates

were "commonplace. 5 9 Even after Congress shifted primary responsibility
to the states to calculate reimbursement rates, courts still recognized that
providers had an enforceable right to receive reasonable rates for their services.60 Suits by beneficiaries are also common: In the 1970s, Medicaid
beneficiaries brought at least twenty-one cases challenging the inhumane
conditions that individuals with mental retardation and developmental disabilities faced in Medicaid-funded institutions. 61 In the 1980s, beneficiaries
brought at least thirty-two such cases. 62 By the 1990s, cases on behalf of individuals with developmental disabilities focused on deinstitutionalization
and providing Medicaid services through home and community-based
waivers. 6 ' By March 2001, there were suits challenging waiting lists in fifteen states and another five suits arguing for greater access to benefits. 64
Suits brought on behalf of children receiving Medicaid benefits are also
common. 65 Between 2004 and 2007, there were at least nineteen federal
lawsuits and four state lawsuits filed on behalf of children seeking to en-

57.
See Brief of Former HHS Officials, supra note 42, at 12-13 (stating in the first 15
years of the Medicaid program, dozens of suits were brought by private litigants to enforce

"provisions requiring states to reimburse providers on a 'reasonable cost related basis').

58.
See id. at 5 ("Private enforcement [of Medicaid] provides a means for meaningful
statutory enforcement... This understanding has been the cornerstone of HHS policy
throughout the history of the Medicaid Act, and remains the prevailing view of those

charged with administering the program.").
59.
Wilder, 496 U.S. at 516 n.14 (collecting cases); accord Brietta R. Clark, Medicaid
Access, Rate Setting an Payment Suits: How the Obama Administration is Undermining its
Own Health Reform Goals, 55 HOWARD L. REV. 771, 774 (2012) ("Since Medicaid's enactment, providers and beneficiaries have brought payment suits challenging state rate cuts and
rate-setting methodology as violating [statutory] requirements.") [hereinafter Clark, Rate
Setting].

60.
See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 518 n.16 (collecting cases after passage of the Boren
Amendment).
61. Feltz, supra note 13, at 187.
62.

Id.

63. Id. at 187-88; see also Perkins & Boyle, supra note 13, at 118 (noting the "growing
advocacy movement to identify and address ... unnecessary institutionalization").
64. See Feltz, supra note 13, at 207 (referencing Figure 2).
65.
See JANE PERKINS, MEDICAID EPSDT CASE DEVELOPMENTS, NAT'L HEALTH L.
PROGRAM 1-2 (2007), available at http://www.healthlaw.org/about/staff/jane-perkins/allpublications/epsdt-cases#VBhZj2RdXbw (listing cases).
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force their federal rights to medically necessary benefits. 66 Today, even
with growing hostility towards private enforcement generally, suits seeking
to enforce provisions of the Medicaid Act are the most common subset of §
1983 suits in the Courts of Appeals.6
The sheer number of cases brought by Medicaid beneficiaries to challenge state non-compliance indicates the important role that private enforcement litigation has played in shaping Medicaid. The scope and variety
of these cases reveals how many aspects of the Medicaid program have
been influenced by litigation. Private enforcement litigation has addressed a
61
wide variety of problems in states' administration. Cases have touched on
most aspects of a state plan, including methods of calculating eligibility,69
what procedural protections are available for beneficiaries when states attempt to reduce, deny, or terminate benefits, ° which services are covered, 1
and reimbursement rates for physicians. 72 In one notable example, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the District Court's use of a circuit-wide, permanent injunction to ensure states were calculating income in compliance with the
Act.
Prior to the injunction, states had been improperly calculating, and
therefore deeming, income between certain family members, causing states
to deny coverage to families who were eligible for benefits under the feder66.

Id.

67.
Medicaid litigation has been the bulk of the post-Gonzaga § 1983 litigation. See
Devi M. Rao, Note, "Making Medical Assistance Available ":Enforcing the Medicaid Act's
Availability Provision Through § 1983 Litigation, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1440, 1460 (2009).
Since 2002, the Courts of Appeals have decided 41 cases addressing whether 23 different
Medicaid provisions are enforceable through § 1983. JANE PERKINS, ISSUE BRIEF: PRIVATE
ENFORCEMENT OF THE MEDICAID ACT PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 1983, NAT'L HEALTH L.

PROGRAM 6 (2014) [hereinafter PERKINS, PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT], available at
http://www.healthlaw.org/publications/browse-all-publications/private-enforcement-of-themedicaid-act-pursuant-to-42-usc-1983#.VGeMrbS-o s.
68.
See PERKINS, PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT, supra note 67, at 8 (listing private enforcement cases challenging state non-compliance in various areas of state Medicaid programs
including: fair hearings, reasonable promptness requirements, institutional payment rates,
free choice of providers, and third party liability).
69.

SARAH SOMERS, Q & A: THE STATE OF MEDICAID DUE PROCESS, NAT'L HEALTH L.

PROGRAM 4 (2013), available at http://www.healthlaw.org/issues/medicaid/record
/a0Pd00000009ybIEAR (describing multiple cases in which courts held that states were required to use transparent and accurate methods for calculating income before reducing benefits).
70.
See id. at 5-7 (listing cases regarding Medicaid due process requirements generally,
and specifically regarding notice requirements, hearing requirements, and accessible procedures).
71.
See PERKINS, PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT, supra note 67, at 8 (listing cases).

72.

See

SARAH SOMERS & SARAH GRUSIN, MEDICAID MANAGED CARE LITIGATION

DOCKET, NAT'L HEALTH L. PROGRAM 3 (2013), available at https://ia601005
.us.archive.org/23/items/801542-medicaid-managed-care-litigation-docket-7-2013/801542medicaid-managed-care-litigation-docket-7-2013.pdf.
73.
Sneede v. Kizer, 728 F. Supp. 607, 612 (N.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd, 951 F.2d 362 (9th
Cir. 1991) (enforcing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(D) of the Act).
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al statute.
Beneficiaries also frequently bring lawsuits to address procedural barriers. For example, Medicaid beneficiaries with mental impairments have
challenged long wait times for receiving home- and community-based services as a violation of the Act's requirement that "assistance shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals." Several
courts have held that the use of waitlists violates the reasonable promptness
provision. 6 In at least two cases the court held that the waitlists could not
exceed ninety days. Similarly, cases challenging excessive delays in processing Medicaid applications are relatively common.7' Federal regulations
require states to process Medicaid applications within forty-five days or, if
the applicant has a disability, within ninety days. 9 When state agencies do
not provide determinations within a reasonable time, beneficiaries can challenge the state's inaction as a violation of the "reasonable promptness" provision, as a failure to provide the required "fair hearing," 0 and if the delays
are excessive, violations of due process rights.8 1
Beneficiaries also routinely challenge terminations or reductions of covered services. Most commonly, parents challenge the state agency's deci-

74.

Id.

75.
See Perkins & Boyle, supra note 13, at 126 (noting that long-waitlists are "[o]ne of
the most common problems that Medicaid beneficiaries experience"); see also Feltz, supra
note 11, at 189 (noting waiting list lawsuits in 15 states); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(8) (West,
WestlawNext through P.L. 113-174) (providing that individuals who wish "to make application for medical assistance under the plan shall have the opportunity to do so, and that such
assistance shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals").
76. See Perkins & Boyle, supra note 13, at 127 n.61 (citing Sobky v. Smoley, 855 F.
Supp. 1123, 1149 (E.D. Cal. 1994); Linton v. Carney, 779 F. Supp. 925, 936 (M.D. Tenn.
1990); Clark v. Kizer, 758 F. Supp. 572, 580 (E.D. Cal. 1990); Morgan v. Cohen, 665 F.
Supp. 1164, 1177 (E.D. Pa. 1987)).
77.
See id. at 127, 129 (discussing Doe v. Chiles where the court held that "Florida's
waiting lists for intermediate care facility services violated the reasonable promptness requirement and ordered the state to establish a reasonable waiting period for ICF services not
to exceed ninety days" and discussing Boulet v. Cellucci where the Massachusetts federal
court ordered the "state Medicaid agency to provide the needed services within ninety days
of the eligibility determination.").
78.
See, e.g., Shakhnes v. Berlin, 689 F.3d 244, 251 (2d Cir. 2012) (suit to enforce
regulation requiring processing Medicaid applications within ninety days); Reynolds v. Giuliani, 506 F.3d 183, 186 (2d Cir. 2007) ("Plaintiffs alleged that the City engaged in unlawful
conduct aimed to discourage and deter plaintiffs from obtaining benefits to which they were
entitled and that the state failed to properly oversee and supervise the City's administration
of assistance programs."); Ability Ctr. of Greater Toledo v. Lumpkin, 808 F. Supp. 2d 1003,
1027-28 (N.D. Ohio 2011). See supra Section JJ.A.2 (discussing waiting-list cases).
79.
42 C.F.R. § 435.912(c)(3) (West, WestlawNext through Oct. 30, 2014; 79 FR
64516).
80. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(3) (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 113-174).
81.
See, e.g., Ability Ctr. of Greater Toledo v. Lumpkin, 808 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 102728 (N.D. Ohio 2011) (denying motion to dismiss plaintiff's § 1983 claim to enforce the "reasonable promptness," fair hearing," and due process claims).
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sion to deny medically necessary benefits for their children. 2 The Act requires states to provide Medicaid beneficiaries under twenty-one years of
age with "early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment services
[EPSDT] as described in section 1396d(r)." 3 The services described in 42
U.S.C. § 1396d(r) include all "necessary health care, diagnostic services,
treatment, and other measures.., to correct or ameliorate defects and physical and mental illnesses and conditions discovered by the screening services, whether or not such services are covered under the State plan. 8 4 As
one district court examining the EPSDT provision explained, this strong
statutory language has led "every Circuit which has examined the scope of
the EPSDT program," to recognize
"that states must cover every type of
85
necessary.,
service
or
care
health
Finally, providers and beneficiaries often bring lawsuits together to demand higher reimbursement rates for physicians in order to ensure that beneficiaries have "equal access" to medical care as individuals with private
insurance.8 6 In the absence of federal regulatory guidance or agency enforcement, courts have been the primary actors ensuring that the equal access promise of the Medicaid Act is met.87 As Brietta Clark, a scholar who
focuses on the structural inequalities in the healthcare system, has noted,
courts have "routinely held that rate cuts motivated exclusively by budgetary concerns violate [the Medicaid Act] because of the failure to consider
statutory mandated factors." 88 These cases therefore are particularly important in times of economic downturn, as states often target Medicaid
funds as a cost-saving mechanism.8 9 The wide variety of topics addressed
by these cases shows many aspects of the Medicaid program have been directly influenced by private enforcement.

82.
PERKINS, PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT, supra note 67, at 6, 8-9 (referencing Table 2
which shows that 23 cases have been brought between 2004 and 2007).
83.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(43)(A); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396d(a)(xvii)(4) (West,
WestlawNext through P.L. 113-174.
84.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1396d(r)(5).
85.
Smith v. Benson, 703 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1269 (S.D. Fla. 2010); Ekloff v. Rodgers,
443 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1179 (D. Ariz. 2006) (noting that the Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh
Circuits have all adopted this interpretation).
86.
Clark, Rate Setting, supra note 59, at 774; see, e.g., Douglas v. Indep. Living Cent.
of S. Cal., Inc., 132 U.S. 1204 (2012).
87.
Clark, Rate Setting, supra note 59, at 831.

88.

Id. at 807 (alteration in original).

89.
Donenberg, supra note 13, at 1515; see also Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Tenuous
Nature of the Medicaid Entitlement: Federal Rights Remain Under Threat and Must be
Strengthened, 22 HEALTH AFF. 145, 151 (2003) ([S]tate responsibility for Medicaid programs has produced program cuts when times are hard, because almost all states are constitutionally prohibited from running deficits, even though Medicaid is a countercyclical pro-

gram and must thus be funded more rather than less generously during recessions.").
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3. The Role of Private Enforcement in an Age of Medicaid Managed Care
In addition to challenging state practices, Medicaid litigation has also
challenged the actions of private companies who contract with the state
agency. During the 1990s, states began altering the structure of their Medicaid programs. 90 Traditionally, Medicaid was structured in a fee-for-service
model. 91 The state agency essentially acted as an insurer for Medicaid beneficiaries: physicians who provided care to patients sent the bill to the Medicaid agency, and the agency directly reimbursed each provider for the service provided. 92 But states, concerned about the rising cost of care, began to
utilize managed care organizations. 93 In the most common form of managed care, states contract with private insurers, called "managed care organizations" ("MCO"), who provided coverage to beneficiaries. 94 Under an
95
MCO structure, the state pays the MCO a flat fee for each beneficiary.
The MCO contracts with doctors and hospitals to develop a network of pro96
viders and those medical providers bill the MCO, rather than the state.
This structure allows states to pay a predictable amount of money per beneficiary and shifts the financial risk of beneficiaries utilizing expensive medical services to the MCO. 9 7 The shift to managed care has been dramatic.98
Between 1991 and 2011, states recognized the potential budget savings of
using managed care and made dramatic shifts: in that timeframe, the percentage of Medicaid beneficiaries enrolled in some form of managed care
has increased from nine percent to seventy-four percent. 99
Although this model is attractive to states because it provides a way to
lower costs and makes them more predictable, managed care often limits
the services available to Medicaid beneficiaries. First, beneficiaries cannot
afford to simply pay more to go out of network.l°° Second, MCOs are frequently unfamiliar with federal requirements and do not always comply

90.

See SMITH ET AL., supra note 22, at 34.
91.
Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid at Forty: Revisiting Structure and Meaning in a PostDeficit Reduction Act Era, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 5, 21 (2006) [hereinafter Medicaid
at Forty].
92.
See Ctrs. For Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Fee-for-Service, MEDICAID.GOV,

http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/DeliverySystems/Fee-for-Service.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2014).
93. SMITH ET AL., supra note 22, at 34.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 35.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 34.
Id.

100.
See Medicaid at Forty, supra note 91, at 22 ("Medicaid managed care today parallels the use of network-style insurance coverage found in the employer-sponsored market,

which conditions some or all contractual coverage on use of specified provider networks.").
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with the detailed procedural and substantive requirements of the Act. 01
This has resulted in certain recurring problems with notice and hearing systems, enrollment practices, and the availability of medical services. 102 In response to the shift to managed care, advocates began a new wave of litigation to enforce the same rights that had previously been secured in the
traditional Medicaid model in this new privatized setting.10 3 Courts have
been very willing to treat managed care companies as state actors for purposes of statutory and constitutional enforcement, 10 4 in large part because
the Act requires that each state have a "single state agency" responsible for
administering the Medicaid program. 10 5 The Fourth Circuit recently held
that "the vesting of responsibility over a state's Medicaid program in a single agency safeguards against the possibility that a state might seek to
evade federal Medicaid requirements by passing the buck to other agencies
that take a less generous view of a particular obligation. 10 6 That is, state
Medicaid agencies are still liable for the failures of MCOs and MCOs are
therefore accountable to the same standards as a state agency.1 0 7 Because of
the single state agency requirement, private enforcement is still viable in the
Medicaid context despite the increased delegation of authority to private entities.
4. The Direct Impact of Private Enforcement on the Medicaid Program
There is little comprehensive evidence about the outcome of Medicaid
cases, although many commenters believe the litigation is essential to en-

101.
See SOMERS & GRUSIN, supra note 72, at 1 ("Statutes and regulations impose detailed requirements on these entities, governing outreach and enrollment, services, network
adequacy, and notice and hearing. Beneficiaries and providers have sued state Medicaid
agencies and, on occasion, the managed care entities themselves, alleging that these requirements have been violated. Certain issues recur regularly, particularly problems with
notice and hearing systems, enrollment, and services.").
102.
Id.
103.
See id. (noting that beneficiaries and providers have sued state Medicaid agencies
and occasionally the managed care organizations themselves).

104.

SARA

ROSENBAUM

ET AL.,

ISSUE

BRIEF

#14,

AN

OVERVIEW

OF

LEGAL

DEVELOPMENTS

IN MANAGED CARE CASELAW AND SELECTED CASE STUDIES OF LEGAL

DEVELOPMENTS

IN STATE CONTRACTING FOR MANAGED BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SERVICES,

GEO. WASH. U. MED. CTR. FOR HEALTH SERV'S. RES. & POL'Y 5 (2001) [hereinafter
ROSENBAUM, ISSUE BRIEF # 14], available at https://publichealth.gwu.edu/departments/

healthpolicy/DHPPublications/pubuploads/dhpPublicationDAEA9DFC-5056-9D203D1BC6235F5C4AOE.pdf.
105.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(5) (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 113-174).
106.
K.C. ex rel. Africa H. v. Shipman, 716 F.3d 107, 112 (4th Cir. 2013).
107.
Id at 112-13; see also ROSENBAUM, ISSUE BRIEF # 14, supra note 104, at 6
("Courts are willing to hold states accountable to beneficiaries for the substandard health
care access performance of their managed care contractors, at least in those cases in which a
state has acknowledged its obligations pursuant to a consent decree to oversee contractor

performance.").
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sure beneficiaries' rights.0 In the absence of effective enforcement by the
state agency, § 1983 suits historically have been the only way to enforce the
Act against non-compliant state agencies and state legislatures." °9 One
commenter has gone so far as claiming that the historical importance of
Medicaid litigation is "beyond dispute." 1 0 Although there are certainly critics of Medicaid litigation,"' there is good reason to believe that the litigation has produced positive outcomes for beneficiaries.1 1 2 One study indicated that Medicaid beneficiaries have been relatively successful at the trial
court level: in 1999 and 2000, beneficiaries prevailed sixty-one percent of
theBut
time."'
as is common in much structural reform litigation, the most im-

108.
There is a large literature in response to the narrowing of § 1983 litigation after
Gonzaga and most of these articles begin from the premise that Medicaid litigation is necessary to ensure beneficiaries' access to benefits-without explaining how or why-and go on
to discuss possible ways to reverse the Supreme Court's hostility towards private enforcement of Medicaid rights. See, e.g., Rachel Min Luke, Reading Between the Lines: Medicaid,
Early Periodic Screening Diagnosis and Treatment, and Section 1983, 7 SEATTLE J. FOR
Soc. JUST. 737 (2008); Colleen Nicholson, Comment, Access to Medicaid: Recognizing
Rights to Ensure Access to Care and Services, 2 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM ONLINE 22 (2012);
Sean Jessee, Comment, Fulfilling the Promise of the Medicaid Act: Why the Equal Access
Clause Creates Privately Enforceable Rights, 58 EMORY L.J. 791 (2009); Michael A. Platt,
Comment, Westside Mothers and Medicaid: Will This Mean the End of Private Enforcement
of FederalFunding Conditions Using Section 1983?, 51 AM. U. L. REv. 273 (2001); Andrew
R. Gardella, Note, The Equal Access Illusion: A Growing Majority of Federal Courts Erroneously Foreclose Private Enforcement of § 1396a(a)(30) of the Medicaid Act Using 42
U.S.C. § 1983, 38 U. MEM. L. REV. 697 (2008); Frederick H. Cohen, An Unfulfilled Promise
of the Medicaid Act. Enforcing Medicaid Recipients' Right to Health Care, 17 Loy.
CONSUMER

L. REV. 375 (2005).

109.
Moncrieff, supra note 41, at 2341. Moncrieff argues, however, for eliminating private enforcement in order to encourage the federal agencies to develop effective administrative schemes. Id. at 2362. However, given the politicized nature of the Affordable Care Act,
this outcome seems particularly unlikely in either Medicaid or the Marketplaces. See Brief of
Former HHS Officials, supra note 42, at 3-4 (discussing how HHS enforcement of Medicaid
is politically unfeasible); supra II.A. 1 (discussing political hurdles to HHS enforcement of
Medicaid requirements); infra Section III (discussing political hostility towards the Affordable Care Act).
110.
Donenberg, supra note 13, at 1503.
111.
See, e.g., Mark Andrew Ison, Note, Two Wrongs Don't Make A Right. Medicaid,
Section 1983 and the Cost of an Enforceable Right to Health Care, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1479
(2003) (arguing that fully enforcing Medicaid is economically unsustainable and allowing
private citizens and courts to use private litigation creates unsustainable budgetary obligations on states).
112.
See Jost, supra note 89, at 148 (discussing how Medicaid beneficiaries successfully prevailed in federal court cases).
113.
Id. Though the beneficiaries were much less successful on appeal-state agencies
prevailed over recipients and providers over 80% of the time. See id. at 153 n.21. Unfortunately, the article doesn't report the raw data, or define what "prevailing" means. See id. at
145-153. It also doesn't indicate what percentage of cases that beneficiaries won at trial
court were appealed or how many of the cases that beneficiaries lost at trial were won on
appeal. See id.
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portant victories for Medicaid beneficiaries come not in the form of trial
court victories, but negotiated consent decrees.1 1 4 Settlements in the form of
consent decrees are an important part of privately enforcing Medicaid rights
because they often contain more detailed requirements than an injunction
issued by the court at the end of a trial. 115 Often, Medicaid litigation comes
in the form of a statewide class of beneficiaries seeking to reform a policy
or practice.1 6 By negotiating a consent decree, plaintiffs can obtain more
thorough and detailed commitments from the state Medicaid agency than
would be contained in an injunction. 1 7 For example, the consent decree ultimately approved in the Frew v. Hawkins litigation to provide children
with EPSDT services contained eleven different actions the Texas Medicaid
program agreed to take to correct its failures, including agreements to improve transportation services, increase payments for dental and physician
services, provide case management services to children, hire more caseworkers, and expand outreach efforts to families. 1 8 Another consent decree,
entered after defendants were found liable for their failure to provide adequate pediatric care, required defendants to "(1) conduct public information
campaigns; (2) provide additional notices and handbooks in English and
Spanish; (3) develop and maintain an information and referral program to
recruit additional providers; (4) develop a bonus program for providers to
encourage proper billing; (5) provide additional training for caseworkers;
and (6) provide reports." 1 9 Other settlements have included provisions as
precise as requiring states to revise brochures and public marketing materials.1 20 Entering the settlement as a consent decree allows federal courts to
maintain jurisdiction over the case and gives the plaintiffs the ability to return to court to enforce the decree through the court's contempt power.
These consent decrees enable advocates to achieve important policy reform-often statewide-with continued monitoring and oversight by the
attorneys and the federal courts.

114.

See Zaring, supra note 12, at 1046 ("institutional reform litigants face powerful

incentives to agree on a remedy rather than waiting for the district court to impose one").
115.
Rosenberg, supra note 12, at 13, 16-18.
116.
See supra Section JJ.A.2 (discussing history of private class actions to enforce the
Medicaid Act).
117.
Id.
118.
See PERKINS, supra note 65, at 6-7.
119.
Id. at 10. see also Hawkins ex rel. Hawkins v. Comn'r of New Hampshire Dep't
of Health & Hum. Servs., CIV. 99-143-JD, 2004 WL 166722, at 6 (D.N.H. Jan. 23, 2004)
(requiring compliance with EPSDT law and allocating $1.2 million for EPSDT services).
120.
Perkins & Boyle, supra note 11, at 132.
121.
Anthony DiSarro, Six Decrees of Separation:Settlement Agreements and Consent
Orders in Federal Civil Litigation,60 AM. U. L. REv. 275, 293, 300 (2010).

https://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol24/iss1/5

16

Grusin: Holding Health Insurance Marketplaces Accountable: The Unheralded

Vol. 24

Annals of Health Law
5. The Secondary Effects of Medicaid Litigation

In order to fully evaluate the importance of private enforcement in Medicaid, it must be noted that the influence of private litigation extends beyond
the outcome of each individual lawsuit. 122 David Zaring has observed that
institutional reform litigation can serve as the "nodes of a nationwide network capable of generating national standards of administration for disparate local institutions., 123 Repeat players who form this network-often
plaintiffs' attorneys-share information, strategies, and best practices to
create connections between each individual case. 124 Zaring points to public
housing and prison reform litigation as case studies of this phenomenon,
which he calls "transjudicial administration., 125 Medicaid litigation provides another strong example of transjudicial administration. Repeated litigation helps specify the requirements of an often-vague statute because a
victory in one case can establish the framework for subsequent litigation
across the country. For example, the victory in Doe v. Chiles126 over long
waiting lists for home and community based services "has become the
foundation for much of the subsequent waitlist litigation., 127 The subsequent litigation spurred by Doe v. Chiles essentially created a national
standard that the "reasonable promptness" provision prohibited the extended use of waitlists, and128in several jurisdictions, waitlists could not exceed
more than ninety days.
Furthermore, national organizations, such as the National Health Law
Program ("NHeLP"), operate to serve as a clearinghouse for Medicaid litigation. NHeLP works with local advocates to identify the best legal strategies and policy practices, explicitly encouraging national litigation strategies in order to create national norms. 129 These agencies track national
trends in litigation and produce guides for advocates to encourage best
practices among the institutional reform cases. 13 For example, continued

122.
See Zaring, supra note 12, at 1015 (stating how institutional reform law suits generate national standards).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126.
See, e.g., Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709 (11th Cir. 1998).
127. Feltz, supra note 13, at 200-01.
128. Id. at 200.
129.
See Litigation, NAT'L HEALTH L. PROGRAM, healthlaw.org/issues/litigation (last
visited Nov. 15, 2014) ("NHeLP litigates, tracks court cases and developments and main-

tains strong alliances with civil rights and advocacy organizations to enforce individuals'
rights to health care"); see also Jane Perkins, NAT'L HEALTH L. PROGRAM, healthlaw.org/about/staff/jane-perkins (last visited Nov. 15, 2014) (noting that NHeLP's Legal Di-

rector "has provided technical and consulting support to health advocates in all 50 states and
national and state-based training around the country").
130.
PERKINS, PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT, supra note 67, at 10 (recommending strategies
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enforcement of the EPSDT requirements remains one of the central issues
in Medicaid litigation.131 NHeLP prepares and publishes dockets that track
EPSDT enforcement litigation to keep advocates across the country aware
of recent trends. 1 2 NHeLP also answers questions from advocates pursuing
EPSDT enforcement actions, setting out legal and policy arguments and
providing recommendations for local advocates based on strategies that
have worked in other courts in the past.133 Often, the recommendations include the suggestion to "[c]ontact the National Health Law Program for assistance if children in your state" face barriers to accessing EPSDT benefits. 13 4 By encouraging local advocates to model their cases on successful
litigation elsewhere in the country, national Medicaid advocates like
NHeLP explicitly strive to create the sort of "transjudicial administration"
of Medicaid state agencies that Zaring describes. In the absence of federal
agency guidance or oversight, enforcing national norms through litigation
and consent decrees becomes critical to ensuring that state budget constraints do not shortchange beneficiaries' federal rights to Medicaid benefits.

Zaring's theory of transjudicial administration accurately recognizes how
repeated litigation in federal district courts creates a national network
through repeat players who appear across multiple cases. 11 5 But the influence of this litigation actually extends beyond the courts. Although structural reform litigation has been criticized generally as decreasing democratic accountability and displacing political solutions,136 in the Medicaid
for advocates pursuing Medicaid litigation through § 1983 cause of action).
131.
Wayne Turner, Health Advocate: Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and
Treatment, NAT'L
HEALTH
L.
PROGRAM
(Oct.
15,
2013) available at
http://www.healthlaw.org/plublications/health-advocate-epsdt#.VluKsskwce ("As a result of
persistent and widespread violations of federal EPSDT requirements, advocates across the
county have filed litigation against states on behalf of low income children who have been
denied medically necessary care. NHeLP has frequently partnered with state and other na-

tional advocates to bring such litigation to enforce the EPSDT mandate. NHeLP's fact sheet
on Medicaid EPSDT Litigation describes some of these cases and how they have helped
children obtain needed services. Some state Medicaid programs currently operate under
court supervision as health advocates and state officials work to correct longstanding violations of EPSDT.")
132.

See, e.g., JANE PERKINS, MEDICAID EPSDT CASE DOCKET, NAT'L HEALTH L.

2-11 (2014), available at http://www.healthlaw.org/publicationsbrowse-allpublications/EPSDT-dockel102014#.UyxHAIFkEkc; see also SOMERS & GRUSIN, supra
note 72, at 3.
133.
See JANE PERKINS, Q&A: DISSECTING THE EPSDT "REQUEST A SCREEN"
ARGUMENT,
NAT'L
HEALTH
L.
PROGRAM
7-8
(2014),
available
at
http://www.healthlaw.org/publications/browse-all-publications/EPSDTrequestascreen#
.UyxDplFkEkc.
134.
Id. at 8.
135.
Zaring, supra note 12, at 1015 (stating how institutional reform law suits generate
national standards).
136.
See SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 12, at 11-12, 125-26.
PROGRAM
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context the availability of litigation often encourages legislative and administrative solutions. For instance, the availability of private enforcement
serves as a deterrent for violating the federal Medicaid statute, creating exante incentives for compliance. 13
Would-be plaintiffs' attorneys also encourage state agency compliance
with federal law. For example, attorneys representing beneficiaries can
write letters explaining the federal requirements and how the state Medicaid
agency or managed care company's current policy or practice does not satisfy those requirements. This process can prompt new rulemaking or revisions in agency guidance without necessitating structural reform litigation,
but the potential for litigation is critical for this form of advocacy to be effective. Even without explicitly threatening litigation, the implicit message
of the letters is that the violation could be enforced in court. The risk of future litigation serves as important leverage for advocates to get in the room
and negotiate more democratically accountable solutions.
Moreover, litigation in one state can actually spur legislative action in
other states. Connecticut's response to the Rosie D. ex rel. John D. v. Romney litigation in Massachusetts provides a single, compelling example of
how one successful case can spur all three responses (litigation, administrative action, and legislative advocacy). 38 Rosie D. was part of the larger
EPSDT enforcement movement. 3 9 The case focused on Massachusetts'
failure to provide adequate mental health screening and treatment for children with serious emotional disturbances and resulted in a comprehensive,
statewide consent decree.14 It is interesting to note that the attorneys bringing the case were self-consciously attempting to achieve national reform of
mental health services for children."14 Additionally, the Center for Public
Representation ("Center"), which led the case, reportedly consulted with a
wide-range of stakeholders to determine the goals of the litigation, including, "behavioral health clinicians, program administrators, medical directors, mental health professionals, children's advocates, health care consult137.
138.
139.

See Donenberg, supra note 13, at 1502.
See Rosie D. v. Romney, 474 F. Supp. 2d 238 (D. Mass. 2007).
See id.at 239-40 (stating how if the Defendants' plan, as ordered by the court, is

implemented and successful then it will "represent a new day for this population of underserved, disabled children" and "holds the potential to be an enormous step forward").
140.
See id. at 238-40 (discussing the Defendants' plan and then detailing the provisos
set forth by the court to help better serve the Medicaid-eligible children).
141.
See Rosie D., About Rosie D. [hereinafter About Rosie D.], http://www.
rosied.org/page-67061 (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (indicating the Rosie D. site was the result of a court order for the state "to develop an integrated system of coordinated services");
see also Rosie D., Goals and Objectives [hereinafter Rosie D., Goals and Objectives],

http://www.rosied.org/Default.aspx?pageld=67062 (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) ("The children's mental health crisis is not restricted to Massachusetts. It is a national problem... Eight
years ago, the Center for Public Representation began developing an initiative to address this
crisis in children's mental health.").
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ants and budget analysts in the Commonwealth and throughout the country. ' 142 The Center modeled their goals for the litigation explicitly on other
policy initiatives around the country, rather than on other litigation. 143 The
spillover between litigation and legislative approaches, therefore, occurs at
both the front and back ends of structural reform litigation.
The case ultimately went to trial and the federal district court found the
state liable for violating the reasonable promptness and EPSDT requirements.] 44 The plaintiffs' attorneys established a website cataloguing the implementation of the remedial plan. 145 For example, after the implementation
of the remedial plan, the website reported that the percentage of children
receiving screens increased threefold within two years.146 The Rosie D. attorneys conscientiously designed the website to provide training147materials
and outcomes data for legislative advocates to use in other states.
Largely as a result of these efforts, the Rosie D. litigation had impacts
beyond Massachusetts; the case became an important part of an administrative and legislative campaign to increase mental health screening in Connecticut. First, the Center for Children's Advocacy worked with the Connecticut's state Medicaid agency to establish a new state program, the
Behavioral Health Screening Task Force, which had the specific goal of addressing the lack of mental health screening in Connecticut. 14' Furthermore,
the data from the Rosie D. consent decree provided compelling evidence of
the efficacy of the Massachusetts-approach, resulting in legislation in Connecticut that mirrored the Rosie D. consent decree. 149 In this way, structural
reform litigation not only results in further litigation, but can also spur more

142.

Rosie D., Goals and Objectives, supra note 141.

143.
See id. ("[Staff] investigated innovative programs that have successfully addressed
the emotional and psychiatric needs of children in community settings such as The Kaleidoscope Program in Chicago; Wraparound Milwaukee; and the Mental Health Services Program for Youth (MHSPY), a multi-state pilot program with a site in Cambridge.").
144.
Rosie D. v. Romney, 474 F. Supp. 2d 238, 239 (D. Mass. 2007).
145.
Rosie D: Reforming the Mental Health System in Massachusetts,
http://www.rosied.org (last visited Nov. 16, 2014); see also About Rosie D., supra note 141
(discussing Rosie D. case and how the site was a part of the remedial plan).
146.
See TEEN SCREEN, NAT'L CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH CHECKUPS AT COLUM. U.,
RoSIE D. & MENTAL HEALTH SCREENING: A CASE STUDY IN PROVIDING MENTAL HEALTH
SCREENING
AT
THE
MEDICAID
EPSDT VISIT
1
(2010),
available
at
http://www.mass.gov/eohhs/docs/masshealth/cbhi/rosie-d-white-mhscreening.pdf
(explaining that the percentage of children receiving screens increased 'just over 14 percent [in
2008] to 58 percent by the fourth quarter of 2009").
147.
Rosie D., TrainingMaterials, http://www.rosied.org/page-84569 (last visited Oct.
16, 2014).
148.
See JAY SICKLICK, CONN. PUB. HEALTH ASS'N. ANN. MEETING, PARTNERING TO
ADVANCE HEALTH POLICY: FROM BLIND SPOT TO MANDATORY SCREENINGS 11 (Oct. 25,
2013),
available at http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.cpha.info/resource/resmgr/2013conference-presentations/cpha blind-spot 10.25.13 .pdf.
149.
See id. at 15-20.
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democratically accountable solutions. The threat of private litigation remains important leverage for groups who might otherwise be marginalized
in the political process. Private enforcement of the Medicaid statute has
shaped Medicaid policy nationwide, both through the use of injunctions to
bind state Medicaid agencies, and by spurring and influencing administrative and legislative policy changes.
B. Legal Avenues to Enforcing Medicaid Rights
This section analyzes the legal framework in which Medicaid litigation
takes place. The Medicaid statute does not provide an express cause of action, 150 nor does it create an implied right of action.151 Private enforcement,
therefore, relies on either a cause of action implied in the Supremacy
Clause or through the explicit cause of action in 28 U.S.C. § 1983.152
By far the most common approach in Medicaid litigation is to rely on the
cause of action provided in § 1983.153 Section 1983 provides a cause of action to challenge "the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United States caused by any
person acting "under color of' state law. 154 In Maine v. Thiboutot, the Supreme Court held that § 1983 provides a cause of action for deprivations
of
155
rights.
constitutional
of
deprivations
as
well
as
rights
statutory
purely
Not all statutes create a right that can be enforced through the § 1983
56
cause of action. In PennhurstState School and Hospital v. Halderman,
the Supreme Court held that a statute does not create a right if Congress indicated only a "preference" rather than an obligation on the states.1 5 Furthermore, no right exists if the statute provides an exclusive remedy for violations of its terms.1 5 When the Supreme Court considered the Medicaid
Act's requirement that health care providers receive reasonable reimbursement rates, in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association, the Court held that
providers could use § 1983 to enforce that requirement. 159 The Court rea-

150.
Jost, supra note 89, at 146.
151.
See, e.g., Stewart v. Bernstein, 769 F.2d 1088, 1092-94 (5th Cir. 1985).
152.
Bobroff, supra note 13, at 33-34.
153.
See Rochelle Bobroff & Jane Perkins, Recent Developments in Court Access for
Medicaid and Medicare Cases, 42 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 246, 249 (2008) (indicating the
Medicaid Act generates the most activity for § 1983 actions); see also Donenberg, supra

note 13, at 1502 (stating § 1983 "actions have become a primary mechanism by which individual beneficiaries and advocacy groups have forced state Medicaid agencies to comply
with federal Medicaid requirements").
154. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 113-174).
155. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1,4 (1980).
156.
Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S 1 (1981).
157. Id. at 18-19.
158. Id. at 28.
159. Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 498 (1990).
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soned that federal agency oversight was insufficient to bar private enforcement of the provision. 16 As detailed above, the courts have since recognized the ability of Medicaid beneficiaries to individually enforce various
provisions of the Medicaid Act. 161
However, recent Supreme Court doctrine has significantly limited the
availability of § 1983 by narrowing the definition of what counts as a
"right" that can be enforced through the cause of action. 162 In 2002, the
Court in Gonzaga University v. Doe revised its test for determining whether
a statute creates a privately enforceable right. 16 The Court held that congressional intent would be decisive and that the marker of congressional intent would be the text of the statute. 164 The Court concluded, therefore, that
the statute must contain "explicit ights-creating" language "phrased in
terms of the person benefited" to create a right for the purposes of
§ 1983.16' Following Gonzaga, private enforcement of Medicaid rights has
dwindled because the statute is primarily phrased in terms of requirements
state governments must follow in order to receive federal funding. 166
Therefore, beneficiaries are seeking other options to enforce Medicaid
rights. 167 Specifically, there has been a large shift towards preemption
claims, 16 which rely on an implied cause of action from the Supremacy
Clause and federal question jurisdiction from § 1331.169 Several circuit
courts have been willing to find the Medicaid law "supreme" and invalidate

160.

Id. at 522.
161.
See, e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 451 U.S. at 18-19; Wilder, 496 U.S. at
498.
162.
See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002) (holding that statutory text
must include explicit rights-creating language to create a right for purposes of § 1983).
163.
See id. at 283-86.
164.
Id. at 285-86.
165.
Id. at 284.
166.
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 113-174); see also
Bobroff, supra note 13, at 63-66 (documenting circuit court cases restricting private en-

forcement of Medicaid provisions after Gonzaga).
167.
See Bobroff, supra note 13, at 69 ("there has been complete agreement that
[claims based on preemption under the Supremacy Clause are] a viable avenue for enforcing
safety net statutes against states"); see also Rochelle Bobroff, Medicaid Preemption Claims
in DouglasAvert the Astra Abyss, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 19, 22 (2012) ("Medicaid preemption claims, must rely on the availability of alternative remedies"); Medicaid at Forty, supra
note 91, at 21 (discussing Medicaid's support for a health care safety net and how it is essential to low income populations in order to access health care).
168.
See Rochelle Bobroff, Medicaid Preemption Remedy Survives Supreme Court
Challenge, 46 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 35, 35 (2012) ("Medicaid preemption claims against

states are vital because the Supreme Court has constricted the availability of other remedies.").
169.
Rosemary B. Guiltinan, Enforcing a CriticalEntitlement: Preemption Claims as
an Alternative Way to ProtectMedicaid Recipients'Access to Healthcare, 51 B.C. L. REV.
1583, 1601-02 (2010).
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conflicting state law. 1 70 In Wos v. E.M.A. ex rel. Johnson, the Supreme
Court assumed, without explicitly acknowledging, that there is an implied
cause of action from the Supremacy Clause for Medicaid beneficiaries.'1
These decisions could potentially open up another avenue to enforce Medicaid beneficiaries' rights against state Medicaid agencies as the Supreme
Court narrows the scope of § 1983.
Although the Supremacy Clause potentially provides an alternative avenue for beneficiaries to enforce their rights, it has significant limitations
compared to § 1983. First, Supremacy Clause claims may offer a more limited remedy than § 1983 actions: "[i]nstead of seeking an injunction enforcing federal law, the complaint must seek an injunction invalidating the state
law or action. 1 2 Therefore, broad structural injunctions, such as those
granted in Rosie D., may be unavailable under a Supremacy Clause cause of
action. Second, unlike § 1983, Supremacy Clause claims are not tied to a
fee-shifting statute, so there may be fewer attorneys available to bring the
cases. 13 Third, the reach of the Supremacy Clause is limited because it is
only available to challenge formal state laws or policies. 174 A Supremacy
Clause claim, as a consequence, might not provide a vehicle to challenge
less formal policies such as delays in compliance with federal timeframesa recurring problem in Medicaid.1 7 5 Furthermore, given this restriction on
the Supremacy Clause cases, states might
begin de-formalizing procedures
16
and policies in order to avoid litigation.
Finally, Douglas v. Independent Living Center strongly suggests that the
Supremacy Clause cause of action may be unavailable if CMS has taken fi-

170.
See, e.g., Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 510 (8th Cir. 2006); Planned
Parenthood v. Sanchez, 403 F.3d 324, 331 (5th Cir. 2005); Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am.
v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 75 (1st Cir. 2001); Concourse Rehab. & Nursing Ctr., Inc. v.
Whalen, 249 F.3d 136, 146 (2d Cir. 2001); Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr. for Women v.
Knoll, 61 F.3d 170, 176 (3d Cir. 1995); Hope Med. Grp. for Women v. Edwards, 63 F.3d
418, 426 (5th Cir. 1995); Planned Parenthood Affiliates of Mich. v. Engler, 73 F.3d 634, 637
(6th Cir. 1996); Zbaraz v. Quem, 596 F.2d 196, 199 (7th Cir. 1979); Lewis v. Hegstrom, 767
F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding it is a "settled proposition that state regulations
which are inconsistent with federal [Medicaid] law are invalid under the Supremacy
Clause"); Hemv. Beye, 57 F.3d 906, 913 (10th Cir. 1995).
171.
Wos v. E.M.A. ex rel. Johnson, 133 S.Ct. 1391, 1398 (2013); see also Simon Lazarus, "Supreme Law " For Medicaid Patients or Just Business?, 47 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
111, 112 (2013) ("the decision implicitly answers the elephant-in-the-room question-Does
the supremacy clause authorize preemption by a federal spending clause-based law that itself
contains no express right of action?-and that the answer is yes.").
172.
Rochelle Bobroff, You Have a FederalRight, but Do You Have a Remedy?, 44
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 428, 434 (2011).
173.
See Bobroff, supra note 13, at 74.
174.
Id. at 74-75.
175.
Id.
176.
See David Sloss, ConstitutionalRemedies for Statutory Violations, 89 IowA L.
REv. 355, 360 (2003); Guiltinan, supra note 169, at 1619-20.
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nal action, such as approving a State Plan Amendment. 177 Instead, plaintiffs
would be required to bring a claim under the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA"). 17 8 In Douglas, the Court granted certiorari on the question of
whether the Supremacy Clause provides an implied cause of action for
Medicaid beneficiaries to enforce the reasonable rate requirements. 179 But
before the Court decided the case, CMS approved the state plan containing
California's provider rate cuts. 8 0 The Court remanded the case to the Ninth
Circuit to consider the new posture and specifically asked whether the final
agency action required the plaintiffs to bring an APA claim rather than a
Supremacy Clause claim. 81 If the Court ultimately adopts this line of reasoning, this decision will limit the reach of Supremacy Clause claims. Due
to CMS's limited ability to effectively review state Medicaid plans and its
tendency to simply provide a rubber stamp, 18 2 plaintiffs will be required to
pursue APA suits, which are highly deferential to the federal agency."' Despite these potential limitations, the Supremacy Clause and § 1983 remain
important options to enforce at least some provisions of the Medicaid Act.
III.

THE NEED FOR LITIGATION TO ENFORCE RIGHTS ON THE
MARKETPLACES

As in the Medicaid context, individuals will need to rely on private enforcement to ensure their due process rights are protected when applying
for health insurance on the Marketplaces. First, the stakes are similar: Marketplaces, like Medicaid agencies, are making eligibility determinations
about health care coverage. The ACA introduced the Marketplaces as im18 4
portant players in delivering health insurance to low-income individuals.
The Marketplaces are essentially online markets where people can shop for

177.
See Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1210 (2012) ("The federal
agency charged with administering the Medicaid program has determined that the challenged rate reductions comply with federal law.... [I]t may require respondents now to proceed by seeking review of the agency determination under the Administrative Procedure Act

(APA) ... rather than in an action against California under the Supremacy Clause.").
178.
Id.; see also Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption as a Judicial End-Run Around the
Administrative Process?, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1, 4 (2012) ("One reason for courts to entertain direct preemption challenges under the Supremacy Clause ... is to enable courts to en-

join the states from acting until the administrative process concludes.") (emphasis added).
179.
Douglas, 132 S. Ct at 1207.
180.
Id.
181.
Id. at 1211.
182.
See supra Section II.A.1 (discussing the difficulties with HHS enforcement of the
Medicaid Act).
183.
See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO.
L.J. 833, 833 (2001) ("The Supreme Court's decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel, Inc. dramatically expanded the circumstances in which courts

must defer to agency interpretations of statutes.").
184.

See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(b)(1) (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 113-174).

https://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol24/iss1/5

24

Grusin: Holding Health Insurance Marketplaces Accountable: The Unheralded

Vol. 24

Annals of Health Law

and compare private insurance plans. 8 5 The Marketplaces, in addition to
running a private insurance market, are making important determinations
for individuals seeking health insurance. The Marketplaces will determine
who is eligible to obtain coverage on the Marketplaces and who is ineligible
because they have affordable coverage through their employer. 18 6 Second,
among individuals eligible for insurance coverage, the Marketplaces are
administering a public-benefit-like program. The Marketplaces administer
premium tax credits and cost-sharing subsidies to make private health insurance more affordable. 1 7 These tax credits are essentially a redistribution
program administered through the tax code - much like the Earned Income
Tax Credit.188
Second, the Marketplaces in many states will actually make Medicaid eligibility determinations.189 Marketplaces are intended to operate as a onestop shop for health insurance coverage.1 90 Individuals who do not know
whether they are eligible for Marketplace-based or Medicaid coverage can
fill out an application on the Marketplace website and will be directed to
the proper insurance.191 This means that the Marketplaces are, at a minimum, making initial assessments of Medicaid eligibility. 192 Some states
have even fully delegated Medicaid eligibility determinations to the Marketplaces, as permitted by federal regulations.1 93 As of November 2014,
over 6.7 million people had
been assessed or determined eligible for Medi194
caid by their Marketplace.

185.
Applicants can also submit their applications in person and by phone. Ctrs. for
Medicare & Medicaid Servs, How to Apply & Enroll, https://www.healthcare.gov/applyand-enroll/how-to-apply/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2014) (noting that applicants can also submit
their applications in person and by phone).
186.
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18081(a) (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 113-174).
187.
See id.§ 18082.
188.
See id. § 18082(c) (noting that the Secretary of HHS notifies the Treasury that an
individual is eligible for advance premium tax credits). See generally Lawrence Zelenak,
Tax or Welfare? The Administration of the Earned Income Tax Credit, 52 UCLA L. Rev.
1867, 1873 (2005) (describing the EITC as a hybrid between a welfare program and tax benefit where the IRS provides subsidies to low-income families through the tax system).

189.
SARAH DASH ET AL., IMPLEMENTING THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: KEY DESIGN
DECISIONS FOR STATE-BASED EXCHANGES, COMMONWEALTH FUND 10 (2013), available at
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/-/media/Files/Publications/Fund%20Report/2013/Jul/16
96_Dash key-design-decisions state based exchanges.pdf.
190.
Id.

191.
See id. at 10-11 (noting how states rely on "communication between the exchange
and other state eligibility engines -such as the databases that determine if individuals are
eligible for programs like Medicaid").
192. See id.
193.
See id.
194.
Kaiser Family Found., State Marketplace Statistics (2014), http://kff.orghealthreform/state-indicator/state-marketplace-statistics-2/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2014) (data is up-

dated each year).
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Furthermore, several states are actually seeking to shift populations currently covered by Medicaid to Marketplace-based coverage with subsidies.
Some states have narrowed Medicaid eligibility by lowering income caps in95
order to shift adults currently covered by Medicaid to the Marketplaces.1
The effect of these actions is to eliminate Medicaid coverage as subsidized
private insurance coverage becomes available through the Marketplaces.
Another approach to utilizing Marketplaces to cover Medicaid beneficiaries
is called "premium assistance. 196 Under this approach, individuals remain
Medicaid beneficiaries but, instead of receiving coverage from the state,
they receive financial assistance to purchase private insurance on the Marketplaces. 197 At least two states, Arkansas and Iowa, have obtained a waiver
from HHS allowing the state to cover the newly eligible Medicaid expansion population, through premium assistance.198 It is clear that throughout
the country the Marketplaces, in various ways, are playing an increasingly
important role in the lives of Medicaid beneficiaries.
A. HHS Regulations Seek to Extend Medicaid Due ProcessProtectionsto
Marketplace Applicants and Beneficiaries

Given the significant role that the Marketplaces have in making Medicaid eligibility decisions and in administering the tax-credits, HHS issued
regulations announcing an explicit policy choice to streamline the Medicaid
and Marketplace applications.19 9 This "no wrong door" policy is intended to
"ensure that no matter where applicants submit the single, streamlined application during the initial open enrollment period, they will receive an eligibility determination for all insurance affordability programs and be able
' 200
to enroll in appropriate coverage for 2014, if eligible, without delay.
195.
See, e.g., DASH ET AL., supra note 189, at 20 ("New York will fully subsidize premiums for parents with incomes up to 150 percent of the federal poverty level and who are

currently covered by the state's Medicaid program but who will transition to exchange coverage in 2014.").
196.
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICAID EXPANSION THROUGH PREMIUM ASSISTANCE:
ARKANSAS, IOWA, AND PENNSYLVANIA'S PROPOSALS COMPARED 1 (2013) [hereinafter
PREMIUM
ASSISTANCE],
available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.
com2013/12/8463-03-medicaid-expansion-through-premium-assistance-arkansas-iowa-and-

pennsylvania.pdf.
197. Id.
198.
Sarah Kliff, The Feds Sign off on Expanding Medicaid to 100,000 Iowans, WASH.
POST, Dec. 10, 2013, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog

/wp/2013/12/10/the-feds-sign-off-on-expanding-medicaid-to-72000-iowans/; see generally
PREMIUM ASSISTANCE, supra note 196, at 1 (detailing the proposals of Arkansas and Iowa).
199.

See 45 C.F.R. § 155.405 (West, WestlawNext through Nov. 6, 2014; 79 FR 66265)

("The Exchange must use a single streamlined application to determine eligibility and to collect information necessary for: (1) Enrollment in a QHP; (2) Advance payments of the premium tax credit; (3) Cost-sharing reductions; and (4) Medicaid, CHIP, or the BHP, where
applicable.").
200.
Medicaid, Children's Health Insurance Programs, and Exchanges, 78 Fed. Reg.
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Specifically, HHS determined that it was necessary to align the Marketplace appeal requirements with Medicaid's fair hearing standards because
HHS "support[s] the protections to the appellant that are provided through
the Medicaid fair hearing process and believe that they are important when
an appeal concerns eligibility to purchase a [qualified health plan] through
20 1
the Marketplace and related insurance affordability programs, as well.,
HHS specifically stated that due process protections should outweigh the
value of flexibility and innovation:
We agree that flexible standards often result in innovative and efficient
processes; however, in this context, where the due process rights involved are related to access to affordable, quality health care coverage,
we consider it important to implement a standard framework for appeals
processes with explicit appellant rights and protections to ensure that appellants receive full and fair review. Therefore, we are maintaining the
alignment with Medicaid
fair hearing rights and are finalizing the provi20 2
sions as proposed.
HHS clearly intended for the Marketplace due process rights to mirror
the Medicaid rights, and accordingly, has promulgated regulations extending Medicaid's due process protections to the new Marketplaces. 20 3 The
emphasis on "explicit appellant rights" reflects an attempt to ensure that
Marketplace applicants are in the same position as Medicaid beneficiaries.
But, in order to accomplish this policy goal, Marketplace applicants must
have privately enforceable rights like Medicaid beneficiaries. HHS's no
wrong door policy signals its support for private enforcement of due process protections against the Marketplaces.
The regulations take many steps to ensure that the Marketplace appeals
process and due process protections parallel the Medicaid appeals process. 204 In Medicaid, eligibility determinations must be made with "reasonable promptness, 2 5 specified by regulations as within forty-five days.20 6
Eligibility determinations in the Marketplaces must be made "promptly and
4594, 4621 (proposed Jan. 22, 2013) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 430, 431, 433, 435,
440, 447, 457 & 45 C.F.R. pt. 155).
201.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Program Integrity: Exchange, SHOP,
and Eligibility Appeals, 78 Fed. Reg. 54070, 54106 (proposed Aug. 30, 2013) (to be codified
at 45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 153, 155, 156) [hereinafter 78 Fed. Reg. 54070].
202. Id.
203. See also Sarah Somers & Kim Lewis, Health Advocate: Due Process, NAT'L
HEALTH L. PROGRAM (Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.healthlaw.org/publications/Healthadvocate-due-process#.VEGcdb5a ww ("federal regulations explicitly extend these rights to
individuals seeking insurance coverage and other benefits through the newly created Health
Insurance Exchanges").
204. 78 Fed. Reg. 54070, supra note 201, at 54106.
205. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(3) (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 113-174).
206. 42 C.F.R. § 435.912 (2014).
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without undue delay., 20 7 The Marketplaces, like Medicaid agencies, must
also include the notice of the right to appeal and instructions on how to file
an appeal in any eligibility determination notice issued to the applicant.2 8
Similar to Medicaid, the Marketplace regulations provide a right to appeal
(1) determinations of the premium tax credit and cost sharing amounts, (2)
determinations of exemptions from the individual mandate, and (3) failure
to provide timely notice of an eligibility determination,2 9 including rights
to expedited appeals and an informal resolution process.210 Marketplace appeals must be accessible to people with disabilities and individuals with
limited English proficiency.2 Finally, like Medicaid, the regulations governing the Marketplaces include the right to continuing coverage pending
appeal.2 12 However, as explained below, under current doctrine HHS does
not have the authority to make these Marketplace rights privately enforceable, as they are in Medicaid. Without private enforcement, individuals who
face delays and improper denials of coverage will have no recourse.
B.

Difficulties Accessing Marketplace Coverage and Subsidies

Despite HHS's efforts to extend due process protections to the Marketplaces, applicants have faced significant procedural hurdles similar to those
that have historically spurred Medicaid litigation. For example, individuals
applying for Marketplace coverage have experienced lost and delayed applications. 213 Individuals have been "looping" back and forth between the
Marketplaces and Medicaid agency; first being told they are not eligible for
Marketplace coverage and to apply with the state Medicaid agency, only to
be denied coverage by the Medicaid agency and told to return to the Marketplace.2 14 The system that sends Medicaid applications from the federal

207.
45 C.F.R. § 155.310(e) (2014).
208.
45 C.F.R. § 155.355 (2014).
209.
Compare 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(3); 42 C.F.R. §§ 431.200-.250 (2014) (Medicaid Protections) with 45 C.F.R. §§ 155.505-.555 (2014) (Marketplace Protections).
210.
Compare 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(3); 42 C.F.R. §§ 431.200-.250 (2014) (Medicaid Protections); 45 C.F.R. §§ 155.505-.555 (2014) (Marketplace Protections) with.45
C.F.R. §§ 155.535, 155.540(a).
211.
45 C.F.R. § 155.505(f) (2014).
212. 45 C.F.R. § 155.525 (2014).
213.
Sarah Kliff, HealthCare.govFinally Works For Some People, WASH. POST (Dec.
2, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/12/O2/healthcare-govfinally-works-for-some-people/; Robert Pear & Reed Ableson, Insurers Claim Health Website is Still Flawed, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2013, at Al, available at http://www
.nytimes.com/2013/12/02/business/white-house-praises-gains-on-healthsite.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&smid=tw-nytimes& r-0.
214.
Sabrina Corlette, It's Enough to Make You Loopy: Inside the Kalka-esque World
of Medical "Loopers", CTR. ON HEALTH INS. REFORMS (Apr. 27, 2014),
http://chirblog.org/its-enough-to-make-you-loopy-inside-the-kafkaesque-world-of-medicaidloopers/.
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Marketplaces to the state Medicaid agencies was not running when the federal Marketplace website was launched, and the data the federal government was able to send to the states often had missing or incorrect information. 215 These types of errors, delays, and improper denials have often
been challenged in Medicaid litigation, because delays and lost applications
implicate the ability to exercise appeal rights or quickly request an informal
hearing. 216 These barriers are particularly troublesome for individuals who
might be eligible for Medicaid. When a Marketplace finds someone eligible
for premium tax credits, it is necessarily making a judgment that the individual is ineligible for Medicaid because if their income is high enough for
premium tax credits, it is too high for Medicaid.21 The converse is also
true: an individual found eligible for Medicaid is also being denied tax

credits. 21 However, it is not clear that the Marketplaces are providing proper notice to individuals who are found eligible for one program that they are
also ineligible for the other and are entitled to appeal that determination. 1 9
Furthermore, there are reports that some of the initial eligibility assessments are simply wrong. Matt Salo, who runs the National Association of
Medicaid Directors, reported that often when the federal Marketplace sends
a file to the state Medicaid agencies, "[a] quick glance sometimes shows

215.
Sarah Kliff, HealthCare.govIs Having Trouble Signing People Up for Medicaid,
WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp
/2013/12/04/healthcare-gov-is-having-trouble-signing-people-up-for-medicaid/.
216.
See e.g., Reynolds v. Guliani, No. 98 Civ.8877 (WHP), 2005 WL 342106
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2005), (partially rev'd on other grounds, (challenging the failure for
New York City to process Medicaid, SNAP and TANF applications within statutory
timeframes and improperly deterring eligible applicants from applying); Shafer et al. v.
Bremby, No. 12-CV-00039 (D. Conn. Jan. 9, 2012) (challenging long delays in processing
Medicaid applications).
217.
See Kaiser Family Foundation, The Coverage Gap: Uninsured Poor Adults in
States that Do Not Expand Medicaid (Apr. 2, 2014), http://kff.org/health-reform/issuebrief/the-coverage-gap-uninsured-poor-adults-in-states-that-do-not-expand-medicaid/.
("The expansion was intended to be national and to be the vehicle for covering low-income
individuals, with premium tax credits for Marketplace coverage serving as the vehicle for
covering people with higher incomes."). In states that expanded Medicaid "the expansion
extends Medicaid eligibility to all parents and other adults up to the new Medicaid limit. For
people with incomes above that limit, other provisions of the ACA-particularly the availability of premium tax credits to purchase individual coverage through the Health Insurance
Marketplaces-will facilitate access to affordable coverage." Id.
218.
For a description of how, in states that have not expanded Medicaid, an individual
might actually be ineligible for either Medicaid or tax subsidies on the Marketplaces. See id.
Because an individual cannot be eligible for both Medicaid and tax credits on the Marketplacea determination of eligibility for one benefit is by definition a determination that the
individual is ineligible for the other program. Id.
219.
See, e.g., Amy Goldstein, Healthcare.gov Can't Handle Appeals of Enrollment
Errors, WASH. Posy (Feb. 2, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/healthscience/healthcaregov-cant-hande-appeas-f-enrollment-errrs/2014/02/2/bbf5280c-89e211e3-916e-e01534ble132_story.html.
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[the applicant is] not Medicaid eligible because they earn too much., 220
New Marketplaces that are still working out the kinks may provide inadequate or no notice of decisions, or will not have sufficient appeals procedures. 221 The Marketplace websites and printed information may not be
available in multiple languages, in violation of important language access
requirements.222
There are also likely to be disputes over the amount of the tax credits individuals are awarded. 223 Advanced premium tax credits are based on predicting income for the upcoming year. 224 However, because the Marketplace systems are also intended to assess an individual's current Medicaid
eligibility, many of the questions are phrased in the present-tense, while
others are in the future-tense. 225 This can cause tremendous confusion as
individuals fill out the applications online.226 Relying on a system where
people guess their own future income also introduces significant potential
risks of miscalculating eligibility for subsidies.22 The result will be a discrepancy between the amount of premium tax credits that people predicted
they would be eligible for and the amount that they are actually eligible
for.228 When people file taxes they will have to reconcile their tax credits,
which could mean a larger refund if an individual makes less money than
expected, or it could mean owing taxes.229
For those states using premium assistance for their Medicaid expansion
population, there may also be disputes over covered benefits. 230 Private
220.
221.
222.

Kliff, supra note 215.
See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 219.
See Ctr. for Budget & Policy Priorities, Health Reform: Designing a Marketplace,

http://apps.cbpp.org/DesigningAMarketplace/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2014) (Connecticut, D.C. Massachusetts, and Minnesota only provide their website in English and do
CBPP.ORG,

not provide additional materials in other language. Several other states provide materials and

resources in other languages, but have not provided language access through the website).
223.
See, Sandhya Somashekhar et. al, Federal Appeals Courts Issue Contradictory
Rulings on Health-Law Subsidies, WASH. POST (Nov. 10, 2014) http://www.
washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/federal-appeals-court-panel-deals-major-blowto-health-law/2014/07/22/c86dd2ce-06a5-1 1e4-bbfl-cc51275e7f8f story.html.
224.
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18082.
225.
See, e.g., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., APPLICATION FOR HEALTH
COVERAGE & HELP PAYING COSTS, available at http://marketplace.cms.gov/applicationsand-forms/marketplace-application-for-family.pdf.
226.
For example, someone who is currently married, but seeking a divorce, might pre-

dict that they will file taxes as a "head of household" but would truthfully indicate they are
"currently married." Id.
227. Julia James, Health Policy Brief: Premium Tax Credits, HEALTH AFFAIRS, 4-5,
(2013), available at http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief pdfs/healthpolicybrief
_97.pdf.
228.
See 26 U.S.C.A. § 36B(f) (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 113) (describing reconciliation process if predicted income differs from actual income).
229.
See id. § 36(f)(2)(A).
230.
Julie Piotrowski, Health Policy Brief: Premium Assistance in Medicaid, HEALTH
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plans covering Medicaid beneficiaries in the Arkansas Marketplace are still
required to cover the full range of health benefits that the Medicaid agency
would be required to cover.2 31 But Iowa obtained a one-year waiver of this
requirement because private insurers often do not provide such comprehensive benefits.232 This is just one of the ways that private insurers, which are
not designed to provide Medicaid benefits, might not live up to the federal
requirements.233
Despite the clear violation of several regulations, HHS is unlikely to enforce these requirements, especially in the early years of implementation.2 34
First, HHS will not even have the option of cutting off funds to the states;
the ACA requires that state-based Marketplaces be financially selfsustaining by 2015.235 HHS could potentially de-certify a Marketplace.2 36
But de-certifying a state Marketplace would require HHS to set up a federally-run Marketplace in its place, which seems unlikely because it requires
more funding and resources. 237 Finally, HHS is unlikely to enforce the requirements for political reasons. 238 The Marketplaces and the ACA more
generally have been under harsh political criticism and attack.23 9 It seems
AFFAIRS, 4-5, (2013), available at http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/briefpdfs
/healthpolicybrief 94.pdf.
231.
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 196.
232.
Kliff, supra note 198.
One big sticking point in the debate over the Arkansas proposal was whether the
private insurance plans would have to provide their new Medicaid enrollees with
benefits that are guaranteed in the public program but not typical on the private
market. A good example is non-emergency transportation, a benefit under Medicaid that provides enrollees with rides to the doctor. This is not something that
you normally see in private insurance plans. But for a Medicaid enrollee, who
may not have a car or fall short on bus fare, this could be a very important benefit.
233.
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 196.
234.
Sarah Kliff, The White House keeps changing Obamacare. Is that legal?, WASH.
POST WONK BLOG, (Aug, 7, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/
wp/2013/08/07/the-white-house-keeps-changing-obamacare-is-that-legal/.
235.
42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(d)(5)(A) (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 113-163 (excluding P.L. 113-128)) ("In establishing an Exchange under this section, the State shall ensure
that such exchange is self-sustaining beginning on January, 1 2015 .... ").
236.
See Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, State Health Insurance Marketplaces, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/FactSheets-and-FAQs/state-marketplaces.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (describing application process for state-based Marketplaces to seek CMS approval and describing 19 states
that have received conditional approval pending compliance with certain federal requirements).
237.
See Jost, supra note 10.
238.
See James, supra note 227.
239.
Since the Affordable Care Act was passed, the House of Representatives has voted
to revise or repeal the law over 50 times. Stephanie Condon, In 2014 Ads, Obamacare is
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unlikely that the Obama administration would draw attention to the failings
of the Marketplaces by initiating enforcement actions. Therefore, practically speaking, private litigation will be essentially the only mechanism for individuals to enforce their rights, at least for several years.
IV. THE PROBLEM: DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WILL BE HARDER TO ENFORCE
AGAINST THE MARKETPLACES

Although HHS intended for Marketplace applicants to have similar due
process protections as Medicaid applicants, individuals receiving coverage
through the Marketplaces will not have the same ability to enforce their due
process rights. 240 The current doctrine governing private enforcement is unnecessarily rigid and will create an arbitrary gap between the ability to sue
the state Medicaid agencies and the ability to sue the Marketplaces. 241 The
newly created Marketplaces will push the boundaries of several important
doctrines that Medicaid litigants have often relied on, and courts will have
to grapple with new questions
of accountability in the face of privatization
242
and divided authority.
There are two key differences between the Marketplaces and Medicaid
agencies that prevent the same strategies that work in the Medicaid context-§ 1983 and Supremacy Clause actions-from transferring easily to
the Marketplaces. First, the procedural due process protections are contained exclusively in regulations rather than statutes, challenging the reach

Part of a Broader Message, CBS News (Oct. 30, 2014) http://www.cbsnews.connews/in-

2014-ads-obamacare-is-part-of-a-broader-message/. Criticism of the law has come from
both sides of the political spectrum. See Burgess Everett & Anna Palmer, Conservatives Not
Satisfied with Mitch McConnell on Obamacare, POLITICO.CoM,

http://www.politico.

com/story/2014/10/conservatives-not-satisfied-with-mitch-mcconnell-on-obamacare112379.html

(Oct. 31,

2014), http://www.politico.comstory/2014/10/conservatives-not-

satisfied-with-mitch-mcconnell-on-obamacare-112379.html ("Conservatives are attacking
Mitch McConnell, potentially the next Senate majority leader and in a tight race himself, as
insufficiently committed to repealing Obamacare."); Dan Mangan, Bad to Worse: Obamacare

Website

Slammed

by

Critics,

CNBC.oRG

(Oct.

18,

2013),

http://www.cnbc.com/id/101124856# ("Even avid Obamacare supporters have been deeply
critical of the rollout of HealthCare.gov."). Although criticism was particularly strong during the initial implentation, it may finally be receding. See Jonathan Weisman, Repeal of
Health Law, Once Central to G.O.P., Is Side Issue in Campaigns, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31,
2014) http://www.nytimes.com/2014/1 1/0 1/us/politics/repeal-of-health-law-once-central-to-

gop-is-side-issue-in-campaigns.html?_r=0 ("Republican attacks on the health care law dominated the early months of the campaign, but now have largely receded from view.").
240.

241.

Goldstein, supra note 219.
See generally, JENNIFER A. STAMAN,

INSURANCE MARKET REFORMS

ENFORCEMENT

UNDER THE AFFORDABLE

OF PRIVATE

CARE ACT

HEALTH

(ACA), CRS

REP.,

(2014), availableat https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=749209.
242.
See generally,T.R. Goldman, Health Policy Brief: The Supreme Court and Health
Reform,
HEALTH
AFFAIRS
(2012),
available at
http://healthaffairs.org/health
policybriefs/brief pdfs/healthpolicybrief_77.pdf.
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of § 1983.243 This difference affects § 1983 cases, but not the Supremacy
Clause cause of action, because federal regulations can still preempt state
laws. 44 The second key difference is the structure of the Marketplaces. The
structure of the Marketplaces themselves vary from part of a federal agency, to federal-state hybrids, to organizations on the boundary between the
state and the private sector, making the analysis of whether a Marketplace
official is acting "under color of state law" for the purposes of § 1983 significantly more complicated.245 These two differences create new hurdles
for individuals seeking to enforce due process rights against the Marketplaces.
A. The Writing on the Wall: "Rights" Enforceable Through § 1983 Must be
Created by Congress, Not Agencies

Although HHS intended for the regulations governing the Marketplaces
to mirror the Medicaid regulations providing due process protections, the
corresponding text of the ACA does not neatly parallel the "fair hearing"
provision of the Medicaid statute. 246 Under current Supreme Court precedent, this difference in statutory text seems decisive. 247 The Medicaid statute states that "a state plan for medical assistance must ...

provide for

granting an opportunity for a fair hearing before the State agency to any individual whose claim for medical assistance under the plan is denied or is
not acted upon with reasonable promptness.2 Courts have found this provision privately enforceable through § 1983, even after the limitations imposed in Gonzaga, because of the clear use of "any individual" in the text
of the statute. 249 Because this right is clearly protected in the statute, the
more specific requirements in regulations are likewise enforceable.250
Using the Court's current approach in Gonzaga,251 it would be difficult
to read the ACA as conferring an individually enforceable right. The courts
have generally only recognized rights where the statute is phrased in terms
of the "individual," "person," or "family," but have not recognized rights

243.
244.

See supra Section I1. See generally 45 C.F.R. § 155 (2013).
See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 884-86 (2000); La. Pub. Serv.

Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 368 (1986)) (The Supremacy Clause cause of action is still
available to enforce regulations). Courts of appeals have unanimously held that Gonzaga
limitations are inapplicable to a preemption claim. Bobroff, supra note 152, at 73.
245. See infra Section JV.C.
246. Compare 42 U.S.C.A.§ 1396a(a)(3) with 42 U.S.C.A. § 18081(f).
247. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273,289-90 (2002).
248. 42 U.S.C.A. § 139 6a(a)(3).
249. Shakhnes v. Berlin, 689 F.3d 244, 251 (2d Cir. 2012); Gean v. Hattaway, 330 F.3d
758, 772 (6th Cir. 2003).

250.
251.
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where they are phrased in terms of requirements on other actors. The section of the Act governing appeals is sparse and lacks any of the signifiers
the Court typically relies on to identify a privately enforceable right:
f) APPEALS AND REDETERMINATIONS.-(1) IN GENERAL.-The
Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Commissioner of Social Security,
shall establish procedures by which the Secretary or one of such other
Federal officers-(A) hears and makes decisions with respect to appeals
of any determination under subsection (e); and (B) 2redetermines
eligibil53
ity on a periodic basis in appropriate circumstances.
Subsection (e) lists the required information and verification procedures
required for a Marketplace eligibility determination.2 54 Essentially, this text
creates a broad directive to the agency to create an appeals process. The text
does not include the specific "rights-creating" language the Court has required after Gonzaga, since it is not phrased in terms of the beneficiaries,
but rather, in terms of the Secretary's obligations. Subsection (e) is also
phrased in terms of the Secretary's obligations to verify information and
collect more data.255
The question for Marketplace beneficiaries is whether the more individualized, rights-granting language in the regulations can establish a privately
enforceable right. The Supreme Court has not addressed the enforceability
of purely regulatory rights through § 1983.256 HHS has made a clear statement that due process protections in the Marketplace should mirror the protections in Medicaid. 257 In order to truly mirror Medicaid protections, the
Marketplace rights must be privately enforceable. However, a majority of
appellate courts, reading two important cases together, Gonzaga and Alexander v. Sandoval,25 have concluded that federal regulations cannot create
a "right" enforceable through § 1983 and that such "rights" must be granted
259
through statutory text. 25
Under the majority rule, therefore, HHS is denied
252.

Bobroff, supra note 152, at 62.

253.
42 U.S.C.A. § 18081(f) (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 113-163 (excluding
P.L. 113-128)).
254.
42 U.S.C.A. § 18081(e) (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 113-163 (excluding
P.L. 113-128)).
255. Id.
256. Bobroff, supra note 172, at 428.
257. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Program Integrity: Exchange, SHOP,
and Eligibility Appeals, 78 FR 54106.
258. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
259. See Johnson v. City of Detroit, 446 F.3d 614, 629 (6th Cir. 2006) (overruling earlier case allowing § 1983 cases based on regulations in light of Gonzaga and Sandoval); Save

Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 938-39 (9th Cir. 2003); S. Camden Citizens in
Action v. N.J. Dep't. of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 788 (3d. Cir. 2001). See also Harris v.
James, 127 F.3d 993 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding, before Gonzaga and Sandoval that § 1983
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the policy discretion to determine how best to enforce the statute it has been
explicitly authorized to implement.
In the first case, Alexander v. Sandoval, the Supreme Court addressed
implied causes of action rather than "rights" created for the purposes of §
1983, 26 but its reasoning is relevant here. The Court emphasized the central
role congressional intent plays when determining whether an implied cause
of action is available. 26 ' The Sandoval Court essentially created a clear
262
statement rule for implied statutory causes of action. It held that a statute,
not a regulation, must contain specific "rights-creating" language in order
to imply a cause of action. 2 6' The Court concluded that regulations, even if
they contain explicit rights-creating language, could not be enforced
through an implied cause of action because regulations are not evidence of
Congressional intent. 264 Because the case addressed only implied causes of
action, the Sandoval Court did not resolve whether the holding applied extended to cases brought under § 1983. 265 But in Gonzaga, the Supreme
Court rejected any sharp distinction between implied rights of action cases
and § 1983 cases, stating:
[w]e have recognized that whether a statutory violation may be enforced
through § 1983 'is a different inquiry than that involved in determining
whether a private right of action can be implied from a particular statute' ... But the inquiries overlap in one meaningful respect-in either
case we must
first determine whether Congress intended to create a fed266
eral right.

Gonzaga emphasizes the centrality of congressional intent in the context
of § 1983 and therefore casts doubt on the ability for regulations to establish a right enforceable through § 1983.
In the circuits that rejected the ability of regulations to create enforceable

cannot be used to enforce regulations); Smith v. Kirk, 821 F.2d 980 (4th. Cir. 1987) (same).
260. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 291.
261.
See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286-89.
262.
Id. at 288 ("We therefore begin (and find that we can end) our search for Congress's intent with the text and structure of Title VI.... It is immediately clear that the
"rights-creating" language ... is completely absent.").
263. Id. at 291.
264. Id. ("Language in a regulation may invoke a private right of action that Congress
through statutory text created, but it may not create a right that Congress has not ...[I]t is
most certainly incorrect to say that language in a regulation can conjure up a private cause of
action that has not been authorized by Congress. Agencies may play the sorcerer's apprentice but not the sorcerer himself.").
265. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 291.
266. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002); see also Alexander v. Sandoval,
532 U.S. 275, 285 (2001) ("Acourt's role in discerning whether personal rights exist in the
§ 1983 context should therefore not differ from its role in discerning whether personal rights
exist in the implied right of action context.").
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rights for the purposes of § 1983, the Courts of Appeals similarly focused
on whether the text of the statute reflected a congressional intent to create a
right.' 6 These circuits surveyed the Supreme Court's § 1983 precedents
and honed in on the Court's language and reasoning emphasizing the centrality of congressional intent. 26 ' For example in South Camden Citizens in
Action v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, the Third

Circuit concluded "the Supreme Court refined its analysis to focus directly
on Congress' intent to create enforceable rights and to confine its holdings
to the limits of that intent., 269 The Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have
also addressed the question of the enforceability of regulatory rights after
the Supreme Court's decisions in Sandoval and Gonzaga, and each court
concluded that § 1983 could not be used to enforce rights created by regulation. 270 The Ninth and Sixth Circuits explicitly concluded that the holding
in Sandoval applied to cases brought through a § 1983 cause of action as
well. 27 1 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the focus on the statute is
especially important when looking at Spending Clause statutes because the
statutory language is necessary to "put a State on notice" of the requirements of the federal statute.2 2
However, simply ignoring regulations as these circuits have done is not
the only possible conclusion after Sandoval and Gonzaga. Some circuits
have provided a little more leeway, allowing regulations to "flesh out" a
statute and therefore be held enforceable. 27 3 This approach still requires
some statutory text to create the right, but permits federal regulations to
greatly expand and detail what the right entails. In Shakhnes v. Berlin, the
Second Circuit considered the Medicaid regulations specifying the ninetyday timeline for receiving a decision on a Medicaid application. 274 The

267.

See Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 943-44 (9th Cir. 2003); S.

Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't. of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 779-80 (3d. Cir.
2001).

268.

See Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 943-44; S. Camden Citizens in Action, 274 F.3d

at 779-80.
269.
274 F.3d at 784.

270.
See Am. Ass'n of People with Disabilities v. Harris, 605 F.3d 1124, 1134 (11th
Cir. 2010) ("we find no congressional intent to create a private fight of action for the regulation's enforcement"), vacated, 647 F.3d 1093 (11th Cir. 2011); Johnson v. City of Detroit,
446 F.3d 614, 628-29 (6th Cir. 2006); Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir.

2005).
271.
See Lonberg v. City of Riverside, 571 F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir. 2009); City of Detroit, 446 F.3d at 628-29; Sanchez, 416 F.3d at 1060.
272. See Lonberg, 571 F.3d at 851; Sanchez, 416 F.3d at 1060.
273. See Shakhnes v. Berlin, 689 F.3d 244, 251 (2d Cir. 2012) cert. denied, 133 S.Ct.
1808 (2013); See Chaffin v. Kan. State Fair Bd., 348 F.3d 850, 858 (10th Cir. 2003), overruled by, Cinnamon Hills Youth Crisis Ctr., Inc. v. Saint George City, 685 F.3d 917 (10th
Cir. 2012).
274. Shakhnes, 689 F. 3d at 254.
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Court of Appeals held that "the regulation's ninety-day requirement merely
further defines or fleshes out the content of the right to an opportunity for
Medicaid fair hearings, such that Plaintiffs have a right-enforceable under
§ 1983-to final administrative action ordinarily, within ninety days' of
their request.",2 75 The Court reasoned that although the Act does not specify
a time frame within which a state must provide a hearing, the statutory requirement to provide an "opportunity" for such hearing with "reasonable
promptness" encompasses a right to "some period of time. ' ,276 The regulation, by specifying ninety days, "simply defines what that period of time
is.

The Tenth Circuit took a similar approach when considering regulations
implementing the Americans with Disabilities Act's ("ADA") ban on intentional discrimination. 27 ' The court found that these regulations were en279
Quotforceable because they were essentially an extension of the statute.
ing Sandoval, the court reasoned:
[S]uch regulations, if valid and reasonable, authoritatively construe the
statute itself.., and it is therefore meaningless to talk about a separate
cause of action to enforce the regulations apart from the statute. A Congress that intends the statute to be enforced through a private cause of action intends the authoritative interpretation of the statute to be so enforced as well. 28O
So long as the regulations did not go beyond the scope of the statute, the
regulations could be enforced as part of the statutory right. 281 What these
two approaches recognize is that Congress is sophisticated enough to recognize and anticipate the interaction between statutory text and regulations.
That is, the Medicaid Act's text reflects Congress' recognition that beneficiaries are entitled to a "prompt" decision, which would include some limited timeframe, but left it to the agency to define the precise scope of the
right.282 The text of the ADA banned intentional discrimination, but left
many of the details of implementing such a ban to the agency.281

275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
statutory

Id. (citing 42 C.F.R. § 431.244(f)) (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 255-56.
Id. at 255.
See Chaffin, 348 F.3d at 858.
Id at 859.
Id at 858. (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 284 (2001)).
See id. ("The regulations simply provide the details necessary to implement the
right created by § 12132 of the ADA. They do not prohibit otherwise permissible

conduct.").
282.
Shakhnes v. Berlin, 689 F.3d 244, 255-56 (2d Cir. 2012) cert. denied, 133 S. Ct.
1808 (2013),
283. Chaffin v. Kan. State Fair Bd., 348 F.3d 850, 858 (10th Cir. 2003), overruled on
other grounds by, Cinnamon Hills Youth Crisis Ctr., Inc. v. Saint George City, 685 F.3d 917
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The provision of the ACA delegating appeals rights should be similarly
understood. The text of the statute recognizes the need for appeals, but
leaves the design of the appeals process to the Secretary of HHS. 84 The approach proposed in this paper is particularly compelling in the context of a
delegation of authority to an agency to create an appeals process. Although
individuals aren't named in the text of the ACA, the text suggests that the
appeals process is intended to benefit individual applicants. HHS is instructed to design an appeals process so that the federal officer "hears" appeals, anticipating that individuals-rather than the Marketplace itselfwill initiate appeals.285 The fact that the text of the ACA contemplates appeals initiated by beneficiaries as of right rather an alternative whose purpose is more likely to be ensuring system integrity, an audit system for example, suggests that the appeals are intended to benefit individuals. There is
also a separate requirement that the Secretary establish a process for eligibility redeterminations-a procedure more aimed at system integrity than
individual appeals as of right-confirming that the requirement for a distinct appeals process contemplates individually initiated appeals. 286
Finally, an earlier section outlining responsibilities of the Marketplaces
when faced with incomplete or inconsistent information in an application
states: "APPEALS PROCESS.-The Exchange shall also notify each person receiving notice under this paragraph of the appeals processes established under subsection (f).,,287 Although this earlier section does not itself
refer to individuals or a right to appeal, the notice requirement supports a
reading of the ACA that individuals have a right to an appeal. Therefore,
although not referred to in the signifiers courts usually look for, a fair reading of the text reveals a congressional intent to provide individuals with the
right to appeal an adverse determination made by the Marketplace, but
leaves the details of how to structure that appeal to HHS.
B. Courts Should Recognize Delegationsof Rights-Making Authority to
Administrative Agencies

As the comparison above illustrates, the current doctrine governing §
1983 requires a clear statement by Congress that individuals have a private-

(10th Cir. 2012) (explaining that regulations impose more precise obligations than the text of

the ADA and that § 1983 could be used to enforce those regulations that impose the details
of the more general statutory right).
284.
42 U.S.C.A. § 18081(f) (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 113-163 (excluding
P.L. 113-128)).
285.
42 U.S.C.A. § 18081(f)(1)(B).
286. 42 U.S.C.A. § 18081(f)(1)(A)-(B).
287.
42 U.S.C. § 18081(e)(C)(West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-163 (excluding P.L.
113-128)).
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ly enforceable right. 2 8 Although the text of the ACA can reasonably be
read as indicating a congressional intent to confer appeal rights, this argument would almost certainly be unpersuasive because courts place heavy
emphasis on the presence or absence of words like "individual" or "family"
when determining whether there is a privately enforceable right. 289 Such a
rigid doctrine ignores the reality that Congress frequently delegates the administration of public benefits (and other programs) to states and federal
agencies with broad discretion over how to implement the programs.
This article proposes revising the doctrine to take these delegations into
account. Specifically, where Congress has delegated implementation to the
states or to a federal agency, courts should examine the federal regulations
and state statutes implementing the program when determining whether a
plaintiff has an enforceable right. The test could still require clear rightscreating language, but when that rights-creating language appears in federal
regulations, promulgated by an agency operating under a broad delegation
of authority from Congress, beneficiaries should be able to enforce those
rights. Therefore, this article proposes going further than simply allowing
regulations to "flesh out" pre-existing statutory rights. The Supreme Court
should recognize that statutory text, such as the Marketplace appeals process provision, reflects a congressional intent to delegate rights-making authority to the agency.
This approach is preferable to the approaches taken by the Courts of Appeals for several reasons. First, it comports with a straightforward reading
of the text of § 1983. Section 1983 states that a cause of action is available
to challenge
ad" ,,290 the "deprivation of any ights ...secured by the Constitution
and laws.
Properly promulgated regulations have the force and effect of
law, and a straightforward reading of the statute supports allowing private
suits to enforce rights "secured by" valid regulations.
Second, the current doctrine improperly cabins agency discretion in the
face of vague statutory text. Under the current doctrine, where Congress has
either not specifically created an individual right or has explicitly delegated
broad implementation authority to an agency, agencies are incapable of creating privately enforceable rights. 291 The result is that an implementing
agency can never play a role in determining whether private enforcement is

288.
289.
290.
113-128).
291.

Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 289-90 (2002).
Bobroff, supra note 13, at 62.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West, Westlaw Next through P.L. 113-163 (excluding P.L.
See Am.Ass'n of People with Disabilities v. Harris, 605 F.3d 1124, 1134 (1 1th

Cir. 2010) ("we find no congressional intent to create a private fight of action for the regulation's enforcement"), vacated, 647 F. 3d 1093 (1lth Cir. 2011); Johnson v. City of Detroit,
446 F.3d 614, 628-29 (6th Cir. 2006); Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F. 3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir.

2005).
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a component of an overall enforcement scheme. Clearly, when Congress
explicitly creates a right, the statutory text limits the agency's discretion.292
This means that, even under this proposal, an agency could not take away
private enforcement where the statute includes clear rights-creating language. But the majority approach to the enforcement of regulations through
§ 1983 removes agency discretion in every instance, even when the statute
is vague or ambiguous, and remarkably, even when the statute explicitly
delegates authority to an agency. This is in direct tension with the Chevron
doctrine, which recognizes that statutory ambiguity communicates congressional intent to delegate authority to the implementing agency.293 Permitting
delegations in the specific context of rights-making authority is consistent
with the general principles governing delegations to federal agencies.
Third, recognizing delegations of rights-making authority would also
comport with the Supreme Court's emphasis on congressional intent. Although the Courts of Appeals largely read Gonzaga and Sandoval as foreclosing any possibility of rights created through regulation, this is not the
only way to resolve the question. The minority approach that allows regulations to "flesh out, 2 94 a right provided in a statute is an example of how the
Supreme Court's focus on congressional intent and statutory text could still
accommodate the realities of the large role administrative agencies play in
implementing statutes. As the Chevron doctrine recognizes, Congress often
intends to leave a policy question open for the implementing agency to answer. 295 Questions of private enforcement are no different. The decision
about whether to allow private enforcement can easily be understood as a
complex policy question best left to agency discretion. In fact, the dissent-

292.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843-44 (1984); Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Annotation, Construction and Application of
"Chevron Deference" to Administrative Action by United States Supreme Court, 3 A.L.R.
Fed. 2d 25 (2005) (Under Chevron doctrine, "[i]f the intent of Congress is clear, the Court
said, that is the end of the matter, for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the

unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.").
293.
Brian D. Galle, Can Federal Agencies Authorize Private Suits Under Section
1983? A TheoreticalApproach, 69 BROOK. L. REv. 163, 165 (2003) (further explaining how

the majority rule of the Appellate Courts is "inconsistent with the theoretical structure of
modern administrative law," and with theories of statutory interpretation, which would otherwise support looking to regulations to define "rights" for the purposes of § 1983. Id at
180.); Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REv. 93, 96 (2005) (noting that al-

lowing agencies to create causes of action where statutes are ambiguous "[t]hough grounded
in well-established administrative law principles, rejects the Supreme Court's apparent preference for a clear statement rule under which ambiguous statutory language is presumed to
reflect a congressional rejection of private enforcement.").
294.
Fair Bd.,
Ctr., Inc.
295.

See Shakhnes v. Berlin, 689 F.3d 244, 251 (2d Cir. 2012); Chaffin v. Kan. State
348 F.3d 850, 858 (10th Cir. 2003), overruled by Cinnamon Hills Youth Crisis
v. Saint George City, 685 F.3d 917 (10th Cir. 2012).
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
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ers who opposed extending § 1983 to statutory rights grounded their objections in policy arguments predicting dramatic, untenable increases in the
amount of private enforcement litigation. 296 The fact that these dissents
were rooted in such policy arguments reflects the fact that questions surrounding how much private enforcement is appropriate are largely policy
questions. Matthew Stephenson, an administrative law scholar, has made a
similar observation: he explained that the decision about how to enforce a
statute is "in many ways more closely related to the executive's prerogatives and duties than to those of either Congress or the judiciary., 297 For example, agencies may use a prosecutorial-like discretion to either over- or
under-enforce certain statutes based on policy preferences.298
David Freeman Engstrom, whose scholarship focuses on federal agencies
and institutional design, has developed an extensive taxonomy of the various institutional design options available for providing agencies with litigation gatekeeping authority. 299 He examines how each different design is essentially a policy choice that optimizes different agency capacities that aid
in rationalizing private litigation efforts. 00 As he notes, there is no single
most effective approach: instead, "optimal gatekeeper design is likely to be
highly contextual and grounded in the realities of a given regulatory regime. ' ' It is, therefore, relatively easy to imagine that Congress might
purposefully leave the choice of enforcement mechanism to the implementing agency to choose how best to enforce a particular statutory regime. This
is especially likely in a context like the ACA, where an agency is tasked
with implementing a very large, new, and complicated program whose different provisions might benefit from different enforcement mechanisms.
Many of the particular details of the regulatory regime were unknown at the
time the ACA was passed-for example, partnership Marketplaces were not
considered in the statute itself.30 2 This vast uncertainty likely prevented pol296.

See Bobroff, supra note 13, at 42.

297.

Stephenson, supra note 293, at 95; see also United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S.

154, 161 (1984) ("[T]he Executive Branch... controls the progress of government litigation
through the federal courts. It would be idle to pretend that the conduct of government litiga-

tion in all its myriad features, from the decision to file a complaint in the United States district court to the decision to petition for certiorari to review a judgment of the court of appeals, is a wholly mechanical procedure which involves no policy choices whatever.").
298.
William W. Templeton, Heckler v. Chaney: The New Presumption of Nonreviewability of Agency Enforcement Decisions, 35 CATH. U. L. REv. 1099, 1105 (1986) ("I]n
Heckler v. Chaney, the United States Supreme Court firmly established the application of the
prosecutorial discretion doctrine to administrative law proceedings by denying review of

agency enforcement decisions.").
299.
See David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J.
616, 644-55 (2013).
300.
See id. at 656.
301.
Id.
302.
See DEBORAH BACHARACH & PATRICIA BOOZANG, NAT'L ACAD. OF Soc. INS. Re-
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icy-makers in Congress from evaluating the particular enforcement needs of
the new Marketplace regime and could have encouraged the broad delegation reflected in the statute.
Fourth, agencies are often better suited to determine when private enforcement is necessary to detect and enforce statutory violations.0 3 This article essentially proposes vesting agencies with what Engstrom calls
"wholesale" gatekeeping authority.30 4 That is, rather than evaluate each case
either as-or before-it is filed, the agency should have the ability to turn
private enforcement on or off.30 5 Allowing agencies to create rights enforceable through § 1983 is one specific mechanism an agency could use to
"flip its gatekeeper switch."3 0 6 Engstrom concludes that it is "mostly settled
in the wholesale context" that agencies have superior expertise, competence, and capacity than legislatures or generalist courts to determine which
categories of cases should be privately enforceable.3
Stephenson has made similar arguments in support of a proposal to recognize congressional delegations to agencies to create causes of actions for
violations of statutes and regulations.30 8 Although he does not explicitly address the question of whether agencies should be able to create the "rights"
that are enforced through the already existing § 1983 cause of action,30 9
several of Stephenson's normative arguments for greater agency discretion
in private enforcement support this proposal as well. The decision to create
a privately enforceable right has the same practical consequence as creating
a cause of action-both enable private plaintiffs to bring an enforcement
action in federal court.
Stephenson argues that generally, the choice to encourage or discourage
private enforcement requires agency expertise.310 Specifically, agencies are
better suited to make these determinations because they have "familiarity
with the nature of the particular policy problem, the substantive goals of the
regulatory scheme, and the likely interaction of private lawsuits with other
elements of the government's enforcement strategy., 311 For Stephenson,

portfrom the Study Panel on Health Insurance Exchanges Created Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Federally-FacilitatedExchanges and the Continuum of
State Options 8 (Dec. 2011), available at http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/
reports/reports/201 1/rwjf71965.

303.
Douglas
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

See e.g., Brief of former HHS officials as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents,
v. Indep. Living Cent. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012) (No. 09-958).
Engstrom, supra note 299, at 647-48.
Id. at 658.
Id. at 657.
Id. at 664.
Stephenson, supra note 293 at 164.
Id.
Id. at 106.
Id.
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utilizing this agency expertise requires extensive flexibility in designing the
cause of action.' 12 He imagines providing agencies with significant authority to modify the private suits to fit the agencies' needs.313 For example,
agencies could determine the remedies and add additional standing requirements and limitation periods.3 14 The full range of options that Stephenson imagines would not be available under this article's proposal because §
1983 already delineates several of these choices. Accordingly, even if agencies could create privately enforceable rights, the agencies would only be
able to opt in or out of the pre-existing defaults set up by § 1983. Agencies
would, however, maintain authority to determine which components of the
regulatory scheme would be enforceable through the mechanism set up by §
1983.
At least in the context of HHS authorizing private enforcement against
the Marketplaces, this limitation on flexibility seems justified as a way to
maintain consistency between Medicaid and the Marketplaces. For example, imagine an individual whose income is on the cusp of eligibility between Medicaid and Marketplace coverage and who applied for coverage
through the Marketplace, but nevertheless, does not receive a determination
within the specified timeframe or a notice of his or her appeal rights. Aligning the available cause of action, remedies, and standing doctrine through
the use of § 1983 would facilitate a single suit against both the Medicaid
agency and the Marketplace. Of course, Stephenson's and this article's proposals are certainly not mutually exclusive. Agencies could easily have the
choice to create their own causes of action
or create rights enforceable
15
through § 1983's statutory cause of action.'
Allowing agencies to create privately enforceable rights would also allow the executive branch to "alter its policy more easily as information and
circumstances change." 316 One potential criticism of this article's proposal
might be that it gives agencies too much discretion and departs from earlier
efforts to put regulatory enforcement on "auto-pilot," and therefore, this
proposal would allow future, hostile political actors to undermine the goals
set out in statutes. 317 The fear of future hostile political actors was certainly
present when Congress was debating the ACA: Democrats delegated significant authority to the states out of a fear that future Republican presidents
312.
313.
314.

Id. at 139.
See id. at 123-25.
Id. at 124.

315.

Id. at 165-66 ("[T]he courts and commentators who advocate allowing administra-

tive agencies to promulgate regulations enforceable under Section 1983 have the better of
the argument, and their position is more consistent with the proposal I advance in this Arti-

cle.").
316.

Id. at 97.

317.
See SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE
LAWSUITS IN THE UNITED STATES 42 (Ira Katznelson et al. eds. 2010).
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would gut the Act through regulatory measures. 3 Democrats simultaneously expected an increase in Democratic states' investment in the ACA
over time, and accordingly delegated more authority to the states. 31 9 This
article's proposal to place more power with a politically accountable federal
agency might raise concerns about antagonistic administrations suddenly
reducing the availability of private enforcement litigation.
This article's proposal, however, only addresses scenarios where individuals have no enforceable rights in the status quo and where the statute is
either vague or has already explicitly delegated significant authority to an
agency. Where a statute contains a clear right, an agency would not have
discretion to remove the individually enforceable rights established by the
statutory text. Advocates could, therefore, still utilize the legislative process
to put enforcement on auto-pilot by enacting statutes with explicit "rightscreating" language. But, in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in
Gonzaga, this proposal would also open the door to private enforcement
when statutory enactments are not as clear. This would ultimately increase
the availability of private enforcement, even if those new regulatory rights
are more tenuous because of shifting politics in the future.
Fifth, this proposal addresses a different kind of statutory text than the
Supreme Court addressed in Gonzaga and therefore that case need not foreclose the possibility of delegating rights-creating authority. The Supreme
Court in Gonzaga contrasted statutes that are "individually focused" with
statutes that "speak only to" a federal agency., 320 The specific statutory
language the Court considered was a direction to the Secretary of Education
stating "that 'no funds shall be made available' to any 'educational agency
or institution' which has a prohibited 'policy or practice. - 32 ' The Court
reasoned that this was two steps removed from the individual because first,
it was directed to the Secretary and second, the instruction it gave to the
Secretary was to withhold money from educational institutions that had a
prohibited policy or practice rather than to provide benefits to individuals.322
It does not appear that the Court explicitly considered the possibility of
delegating rights-making authority when deciding Gonzaga and therefore, it
might be possible to distinguish the ACA without disrupting the current
precedent. The ACA, unlike the statute at issue in Gonzaga, contains an explicit and broad delegation of authority rather than a precise mandate.323
318.
Anne Joseph O'Connell, Bureaucracy at the Boundary, 162 U. PA. L. REv. 841,
881 (2014).
319. Id.
320. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 287 (2002).
321. Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)).
322. Id.
323.
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18081(f).
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The ACA, unlike the statute at issue in Gonzaga, does not provide clear instructions or prohibitions to the Secretary of HHS. Instead, the only instruction is to create an appeals program.3 24 Within that instruction, the Secretary
could exercise discretion over whether to implement privately enforceable
rights or not. In this case, the Secretary made a very clear policy choice to
model the regulations on the Medicaid statute.325 Given HHS' longstanding
preference for private enforcement of Medicaid, 326 it is logical that, as a
matter of policy design, HHS would explicitly encourage private enforcement of the parallel regulations governing the Marketplaces. It does not appear that the Court, when deciding Gonzaga, explicitly considered the possibility that Congress might delegate rights-making authority as part of an
even broader delegation and therefore, it is possible to distinguish the ACA
without disrupting the current precedent.
In addition to these doctrinal and theoretical arguments, this article adds
a practical perspective. In cooperative-federalism programs, in particular,
regulations are often the key terms defining the relationship between the
states and the federal government. Some courts of appeals have emphasized
the need for clear statutory language in order to put the states on notice of
Medicaid beneficiaries' rights to sue the state.32 This approach relies on the
notion that spending clause programs are contracts between the state and
federal government. 321 Often this theory is invoked in an effort to restrict
the scope of § 1983 and justify a clear statement rule. For example, Judge
Easterbrook stated: "Section 1983 allows courts to enforce personal rights,
but a statute may influence behavior without creating 'rights.' Conditional
funding is an example. It does not create 'rules,' let alone 'rights,' for a
state is free to turn down the money and escape the strings., 329 Thus, he opposes "[c]hanging the conditions on which states have agreed to participate
in a federal program-by adding private to public enforcement and adding
different remedies in the process., 330 Although the Supreme Court has never adopted this approach,3 1 Justices Scalia and Kennedy flirted with the idea
3
ina concurring opinion.

324.
42 U.S.C.A. 18081(f)(1).
325.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Program Integrity: Exchange, SHOP,
and Eligibility Appeals, 78 Fed. Reg. 54106 (Aug. 30, 2013) (to be codified at C.F.R. pt.
147, 153, 155, 156).
326.
See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Program Integrity: Exchange,
SHOP, and Eligibility Appeals, 78 Fed. Reg. at § II.
327.
See Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2005).
328.
See Zambrano v. Reinert, 291 F.3d 964, 973 (7th Cir. 2002) (Easterbrook, concurring).
329.
Id.

330. Id.
331.
Bobroff, supra note 13, at 55-56 (Scalia's concurrence [in Blessing v. Freestone,
520 U.S. 329 (1997)] questioned 'whether § 1983 ever authorizes the beneficiaries of a fed-
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Judges and commentators adopting this theory argue that individual beneficiaries only have enforceable rights if they are explicitly delineated in the
terms of the contract. ' However, this theory relies on an unsupported assumption that only the statute defines the contract terms. For example,
Judge Easterbrook argues that the question for § 1983 "is whether the
courts will play by the rules that Congress has laid down. Enforcement
through threats of funding cutoff is cumbersome... Which may be exactly
the point; the states' advocates in Congress may have succeeded in limiting
' But there is no reason that
remedies in order to increase states' leeway."333
the negotiation between the states and the federal government stops with
the statute. In the context of a broad delegation of federal authority, the
states are on notice to look to the agency for the specific terms of the contract, since implementing a program based solely on the vague statute
would not provide much guidance.
In practice, Medicaid agencies and Marketplace boards interact directly
with HHS and rely heavily on guidance and direction from the agency rather than on their own interpretation of the statute.334 The implementation
of the Marketplaces shows how the regulations and even informal guidance
were actually the terms that the states relied on when deciding whether to
establish Marketplaces.335 One of the primary motivations among officials
in states that defaulted to the federal Marketplaces was the uncertainty
about what HHS would require from state-based Marketplaces in future
federal regulations.336 Officials in these states were hesitant to sign up for
state-based Marketplaces "without knowing all the terms and potential
costs., 337 Some states expressed significant frustration at the delay in promulgating regulations because without the regulations, states did not have
sufficient guidance to implement the requirements of the ACA.338 Other
states saw the delay in regulations as opportunities for continued negotiation: states saw an opportunity to leverage the uncertainty in the federal
eral-state funding and spending agreement... to bring suit.' In doing so, Scalia suggested a
new, insurmountable procedural hurdles [sic] to bar enforcement of safety net statutes via §
1983.").
332.
See, e.g., Zambrano, 291 F.3d at 973 (Easterbrook, concurring).
333.
Id.
334.
Federal Policy Guidance, MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov/federalpolicy-guidance/federal-policy-guidance.html. ("As part of the state-federal partnership in
administering the Medicaid and CHIP programs, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) issues guidance in the form of letters to State Medicaid Directors ... State
Medicaid Director Letters ... are used to provide states with guidance and clarification on
current information and/or statutory changes pertaining to Medicaid and CHIP policy and
financing.").
335.
DASH ET AL, supra note 189, at 11.
336.
Id.

337.
338.

Id.
Id.
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339
regulations in order to shape federal policy to their liking.
Furthermore, several of the state statutes creating the Marketplaces explicitly acknowledge the importance of both federal regulations and informal guidance and require states to comply with them. For instance, Connecticut authorizes its Marketplace to "[d]o all acts and things necessary
and convenient to carry out the purposes of the exchange, provided such
acts or things shall not conflict with the provisions of the Affordable Care
Act, regulations adopted thereunder or federal guidance issued pursuant to
the Affordable Care Act., 340 California's Marketplace statute defines the
"federal act" as "the federal Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(Public Law 111-148), as amended by the federal Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-152), and any amendments to, or regulations or guidance issued under, those acts. ,,341 Minnesota
even specifically requires its Marketplace to follow federal guidance in designing the appeals process: "the board shall establish hearing processes
which provide for a reasonable opportunity to be heard and timely resolution of the appeal and which are consistent with the requirements of federal
law and guidance., 342 When choosing whether to operate a state-based
Marketplace, these state officials clearly relied heavily on the regulations
and even informal guidance. The behavior of these state officials suggests
that in practice the regulations, rather than statutes, may actually be the
most important source of contract terms. Therefore, a theory that recognizes
the delegation of "rights-making" authority is entirely compatible with, and
perhaps more faithful to, the contract theory and the need to put the states
on notice, since states look to federal regulations and guidance to understand their obligations before opting into the statutory scheme.
Finally, the fact that the Supreme Court has been hostile to allowing regulations to create implied causes of action is not necessarily a fatal blow to
this theory. The Court was faced with a similar situation when it first extended § 1983 to cover not only constitutional rights, but also statutory
rights.343 The Court previously limited the availability of implied causes of
action emerging from statutes, and only then did it have to grapple with the
question of whether § 1983 could be extended to support causes of action
based on statutory rights.3 " When faced with this dilemma, the Court chose
to extend the reach of § 1983 where it had declined to extend implied causes of action.345 The stage is set the same now. In Sandoval, the Court lim-

339.

Id.

340.

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

341.

CAL. GOV'T CODE §

342.

MINN.

§ 38a-1083 (West 2014).
100501 (West 2013).

343.

STAT. ANN. § 62V.05 (West, 2013).
Samberg-Champion, supra note 34, at 1844.

344.
345.

Id.
Id.
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46
ited the availability of implied causes of action based on regulations.
Now the Court must grapple with whether § 1983 can extend to regulations.

C. Difficulties Enforcing Rights Against Marketplaces in the Face of
Privatization
Another potential barrier to litigation is that most of the Marketplacesand even officials working for the state-based Marketplaces-may not be
considered entities acting "under color of state law" for purposes of § 1983.
Medicaid
requires that the program be administered by a "single [s]tate
,,147
agency.
Because injunctive relief is not available against a state directly,
the defendants in Medicaid litigation are the state officials in charge of state
Medicaid agencies, rather than the agencies themselves.148 The majority of
the state-based Marketplaces, however, are not state agencies, which may
create additional hurdles in bringing private suits to enforce public rights.
There are two important design decisions that will determine whether a
given Marketplace will count as a state-actor for purposes of § 1983 and the
Supremacy Clause. The first-and most obvious-decision is how involved
a state is in running its Marketplace. Depending on the level of state involvement, the Marketplaces could take three forms: (1) federallyfacilitated, (2) state-based, or (3) "partnership" or "hybrid" Marketplaces.349
Currently, there are twenty-seven Federally-Facilitated Marketplaces
("FFM"), seven partnership Marketplaces, and seventeen state-based Marketplaces.3 50 The District of Columbia also established a state-based Marketplace.351 The FFMs were established in states that elected not to establish state-based Marketplaces.35 2 FFMs have no state involvement and are
administered by HHS, a federal agency.3 53 Although the ACA gives HHS
the option to administer the FFMs either directly or through agreement with

346.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286-89.
347.
42 U.S.C.A. § 139 6 a(a)(5) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-163 (excluding P.L.
113-128, 113-159)) (approved Aug. 8, 2014); 42 C.F.R. § 431.10.
348.
See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 166-67 (1908) (holding that although injunctions are not available against a state directly, private citizens can obtain injunctions against
state officials in their official capacities.).
349.
Katie Keith &Kevin W. Lucia, IMPLEMENTING THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: THE
STATE OF THE STATES, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, 10-11 (Jan. 2014), available at
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/-/media/files/publications/fundreport/2014/jan/1727 keith implementing-aca state of states.pdf.
350.
DASH ET AL., supra note 189, at 6.
351.
Id.
352.
Keith & Lucia, supra note 349 at10-1 1.
353.
42 U.S.C.A. § 18041; see also CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & OVERSIGHT, Federal
Marketplace Progress Fact Sheet: ProgressContinues in Building Marketplaces, CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (May 31, 2013), http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources
/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/ffe.html (stating that the Marketplace will be developed by CMS in
states that have opted out of building their own Marketplace).

https://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol24/iss1/5

48

Grusin: Holding Health Insurance Marketplaces Accountable: The Unheralded

Vol. 24

Annals of Health Law

a non-profit entity, HHS decided that the agency "will carry out all Ex"3154
change functions.
Therefore, the FFMs are plainly not state actors and cannot be the subject
3 55
of litigation through either traditional pathway for Medicaid litigation.
Instead, lawsuits challenging the actions of the FFM will likely be brought
under the APA.3 56 However, the APA is not especially receptive to structural reform litigation.15 First, courts are not amenable to reviewing agency
inaction.358 When requesting judicial review of agency inaction, the action
requested by the plaintiff must be discrete and mandatory.3 59 For an action
to be "mandatory," a law (either statute or regulation) must require the
agency take the requested action.160 For example, the Supreme Court explained that "when an agency is compelled by law to act within a certain
time period, but the manner of its action is left to the agency's discretion, a
court can compel the agency to act, but has no power to specify what the
action must be. 3 61 The advantage of APA suits is that regulations may be
enforceable against the FFMs, unlike the state-based Marketplaces. The
disadvantage is that the "discrete" requirement "precludes ...broad programmatic attack. 3 62 Individuals may be able to challenge individual instances of agency inaction, such as the FFM's failure to deliver a decision
on tax credit eligibility, where regulations establish clear procedural re-

354.

CTR. FOR

CONSUMER

INFO. &

OVERSIGHT, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID

4 (May 16, 2012),
available at http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/Downloads/ffeguidance-05-16-2012.pdf.
355. McCloskey v. Mueller, 446 F.3d 262, 271 (1st Cir. 2006) ("[A] section 1983 claim
ordinarily will not lie against a federal actor."); See, e.g., D.C. v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 42425 (1973) ("[A]ctions of the Federal Government and its officers are at least facially exempt
from [§ 1983's] proscriptions.").
356. 5 U.S.C.A. 501 et seq. Although there was some history of structural reform litigation against federal agencies in the early 1970s, these cases appear to be based on either implied causes of action from the constitution or a federal common law cause of action. See
Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1161-62 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Today, these cases would
likely proceed under the APA's presumption of reviewability of agency inaction. See Salvador v. Bennett, 800 F.2d 97, 99 (7th Cir. 1986) (characterizing Adams v. Richardson as an
exception to the principle of un-reviewability of agency inaction). Other litigation against
federal agencies has relied on more specific causes of action. For example, in Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 2001), the plaintiffs relied on a violation of their fiduciary duty, which is specific to the Department of the Interior's role in managing trusts, not a
trans-substantive cause of action.
357. See e.g., Salvador v. Bennett, 800 F.2d 97, 99 (7th Cir. 1986) (explaining the general the principle of un-reviewability of agency inaction).
358. See, e.g., Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 64-65 (2004).
359. See id. at 61.
360. Id. at 65.
361. Id. at 64.
362. Id.
SERVS. GENERAL GUIDANCE ON FEDERALLY-FACILITATED EXCHANGES
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quirements. But broad structural reform litigation, like that in Rosie D. ,363

which seeks to reform an agency's overall functioning, may be unavailable
against the FFMs.
Partnership Marketplaces are a variant on the FFMs. 364 They are creatures of regulation not originally contemplated by the federal statute.365
HHS chose to structure these Marketplaces as FFMs, which are authorized
by statute, but is permitting states to take on some responsibilities.3 66 In the
partnership Marketplaces, HHS runs the core Marketplace functions, including eligibility, enrollment, and financial management. 367 Nevertheless,
states can opt to take on additional responsibilities, such as plan management, consumer assistance, or both. 361 In terms of eligibility denials and appeals procedures, the partnership Marketplaces will likely be treated the
same as FFMs because HHS will retain authority over the core functions.
Additionally, the federal government retains ultimate authority over the
operation of the marketplace. 369 Even if state employees staff the partner-

ship Marketplaces and process applications, courts are unlikely to consider
them to be "acting under color of state law." For example, state agencies
tasked with making disability determinations for Social Security disability
benefits were "acting under color of federal law" because Social Security
"funds are entirely of federal origin and the state agencies function solely as
agents of the Secretary ... applying federal law and federal regulations in

accordance with procedures prescribed by her.",37 0 Even if the state's employees had established a practice of violating state law, the Second Circuit
determined that just because state officials are the ones implementing a federal statute,
are still pursuant to federal law rather than "under
colorof sttetheir actions
,,371
color of state law.
So long as the federal government provides funding
363.
See supra Section II.A (describing the broad reforms secured through Rosie D. v.
Romney, 474 F. Supp. 2d 238, 239-40 (D. Mass. 2007)).
364.
DASH ET AL, supra note 189, at 3.
365.
See DEBORAH BACHARACH & PATRICIA BOOZANG, NAT'L ACAD. OF Soc. INS. Reportfrom the Study Panel on Health Insurance Exchanges Created Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Federally-FacilitatedExchanges and the Continuum of
State Options 8 (Dec. 2011), available at Grusin Final Edits.docxhttp://www.
rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/reports/201 1/rwjf71965.
366.
Id.
367.
Id. at 2.
368.
Id. at 5-6.
369. DASH ET AL., supra note 189, at 19 n.15.
370.
Ellis v. Blum, 643 F.2d 68, 83 n.17 (2d Cir. 1981).

371.
Id. ("the authority under which this is done is nonetheless federal. The mere fact
that the federal agents happen to be state officials does not, without more, convert every intentional deviation from the federal path into an action taken under color of state law"); see
also Rosas v. Brock, 826 F.2d 1004, 1007 (11th Cir. 1987) (denying of Disaster Unemployment Assistance by the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security was not state
action because the denial was based solely on a United States Department of Labor handbook, which was based on a Department of Labor regulation); cf. R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort
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for state partnership Marketplaces and maintains authority over the core
functions of the Marketplaces, including eligibility and enrollment responsibilities, it is unlikely that state involvement would transform actions taken
by partnership Marketplaces into actions taken "under color of state law."
Even in the state-based Marketplaces, potential plaintiffs may face difficulty characterizing the actions of the Marketplaces as clearly "state" or
"federal." This is because even within the state-based Marketplaces federal
agencies play a significant role. First, in order to verify an individual's immigration status, social security number, and residency, Marketplaces must
seek verification from various federal agencies, including HHS, the Social
Security Administration, and the Department of Homeland Security.3 72 If an
individual seeks to challenge the verification procedures or the information
provided by the federal agency, this may be considered federal action, rather than action "under color of state law," even if a state-official requests
the verification.
Second, states have the option to utilize the HHS federal appeals entity in
several instances. Appeals to the HHS appeals entity are available after exhaustion of a state-based appeals system. 3 Alternatively, if a state has not
established an appeals system, the appeal may proceed directly to the HHS
appeals entity. 4 State-based Marketplaces also have the option to delegate
a subset of appeals-those seeking exemptions from the penalty for not
having insurance-to the HHS appeals entity. 5 This is a novel structure
where the federal government has delegated authority to the states, only to
allow the states to re-delegate back to the federal agency. But this structure
will make it difficult to assess who is accountable when individuals do not
receive notice or a response to an appeal. Imagine an individual who requests an appeal in a state where either the state has failed to establish an
appeals process or the appeal has been delegated to HHS. If the individual
never receives acknowledgement of the appeal request, the individual will
not know whether the state failed to send the information to HHS, or
whether HHS received the information but failed to process it. Individuals
would need to use different causes of action, likely § 1983 and an APA
claim, to review HHS' inaction in order to name both defendants and bring
both parties into the suit.
Belknap Hous. Auth., 719 F.2d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that housing authority created by Indian tribal law pursuant to federal statute did not act under color of state law); but

see Tongol v. Usery, 601 F.2d 1091, 1097 (9th Cir. 1979) ("[T]he actions of state agencies
administering federally-funded programs have been held to be actions undertaken under color of state law for the purposes of section 1983.") (citing Green v. Dumke, 480 F.2d 624,
628 (1973)).
372.
373.
374.
375.
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In addition to different hurdles for even advancing the claim, these
claims operate with different substantive standards. Given the current doctrine, regulations would be enforceable against HHS, but not against the
state-based Marketplace. Furthermore, courts would be deferential to HHS
actions that might receive more scrutiny if conducted by the state Market376
places being reviewed under § 1983.
Therefore, determining who is responsible for the failure to provide notice or process an appeal will be critical in determining under which legal regime the case proceeds. The fact
that the new administrative system is so intensely integrated between federal and state actors also calls into question the rigid, categorical quality of
the current access to court doctrines.
Beyond the federal-state divisions of authority, state-based Marketplaces
also have options to divide authority among public or private actors. If a
state has elected to implement a state-based Marketplace, states can set up
that Marketplace as part of an existing state agency or office, as an independent state agency, or as a non-profit entity. 377 State-based Marketplaces
are typically established through legislation, though some states created
state-based Marketplaces through executive orders. 37 ' Among the eighteen
state-based Marketplaces, there are several different governance structures.
Five states established the Marketplaces within existing state agencies, one
established the Marketplace as a new state agency, ten states and the District of Columbia established the Marketplaces as quasi-governmental entities, and one state set up the Marketplace as a private non-profit.3 79 Medicaid federal law requires that a "single state agency" have the primary and
ultimate responsibility for the program. 380 Therefore, the "under color of
state law" requirement of § 1983 was not a hurdle for Medicaid litigation.
In the six states that chose to establish their Marketplaces as either part of
an existing state agency or as a new state agency, the § 1983 cause of action

376.
Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEo. L.J. 833,
833 (2001) ("The Supreme Court's decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Counsel, Inc. dramatically expanded the circumstances in which courts must defer
to agency interpretations of statutes.").
377.
See DASH ET AL, supra note 189, at 10 (describing choices states made regarding

marketplace governance structures).
378. Press Release, Andrew M. Cuomo, Governor Cuomo Issues Executive Order Establishing
Statewide
Health
Exchange
(Apr.
12,
2012)
available at
http://www.governor.ny.gov/press/04122012-EO-42 (establishing New York's state-based
marketplace).

379. DASH ET AL., supra note 189, at 10 (Kentucky, New York, Rhode Island, Utah, and
Vermont utilized existing state agencies. Nevada established a new state agency. California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Mexico, Oregon,

Washington and the District of Columbia established "quasi-governmental entities", Hawaii
established a private non-profit.).
380. See 42 § U.S.C. 1396a(a)(5) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-163 (excluding P.L.
113-128)) (approved Aug. 8, 2014).
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will similarly be available to enforce applicants' federal rights.3 81
However, plaintiffs seeking to litigate against the private non-profit and
quasi-public Marketplaces may face new hurdles. Even where private contractors took on responsibilities administering Medicaid, the single state
agency remains ultimately responsible for the private contractors' actions.3 8 2 The Fourth Circuit recently explained that the single state agency
requirement is justified by efficiency and accountability rationales:
From an efficiency perspective, the requirement ensures that final authority to make the many complex decisions governing a state's Medicaid
program is vested in one (and only one) agency. The requirement thereby
avoids the disarray that would result if multiple state or even local entities were free to render conflicting determinations about the rights and
obligations of beneficiaries and providers ....

With respect to the ac-

countability rationale, the vesting of responsibility over a state's Medicaid program in a single agency safeguards against the possibility that a
state might seek to evade federal Medicaid requirements by passing the
buck to38other
agencies that take a less generous view of a particular obli3
gation.

The Fourth Circuit held that the single state agency's ultimate authority
extended even to litigation decisions.38 4 A private insurance company that
contracted with the state Medicaid agency to provide managed care services
to North Carolina's beneficiaries could not independently appeal
a decision
38 5
by the district court that the state agency chose not to appeal.
Gillian Metzger, a constitutional law scholar, made related arguments
about the importance of clear accountability mechanisms for private entities
that contract to provide government services. She has described the particular importance (and difficulty) of ensuring procedural due process protections when private entities determine third-parties access to government
benefits. 386 Accountability and government oversight of private delegations
are important for two reasons, she argues. First, it is important because the
government can benefit and learn from the private expertise and innovation.38 Second, accountability is necessary to ensure continued public control of government programs and to guard against self-interested private de-

381. See DASH ET AL., supra note 189, at 10 (Kentucky, Nevada, New York, Rhode Island, Utah, and Vermont used a state agency structure).
382. K.C. ex rel v. Shipman, 716 F.3d 107, 112 (4th Cir. 2013).
383.

Id.

384.
385.

Id.
Id.

386.

Gillian Metzger, Private Delegations, Due Process and the Duty to Supervise in

GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT,

387.

Published by LAW eCommons, 2015

291, 295 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minor, eds.) (2009).

Id. at 296.

53

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 24 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 5

Holding Health InsuranceMarketplaces Accountable

2015

cision-making.38 8 The risk of self-interested decision-making is exacerbated
where "providers hold a monopoly on provision of particular services... or
recipients are relatively powerless."3 8 9 Metzger identifies several different
approaches to structuring private delegations that can help to protect procedural due process rights: one option is to impose "independently enforceable" procedural and substantive "constraints on its private delegates. 390
These protections "must be equivalent to those that would result if the private entities in question were directly subject to constitutional constraints. ' '39' This is precisely what the single state agency requirement in
Medicaid accomplishes. The plaintiffs can name the private insurance companies as well as the top state Medicaid official in litigation, directly subjecting the private entities to the same constitutional and statutory obligations that the state agency is bound by. 392 Yet, this mechanism is absent in
the Marketplace context.
The private and quasi-private Marketplaces are an example of exactly the
kind of privatization that Metzger argues requires special accountability
mechanisms to protect constitutional-and in this case, federal regulatoryrights. State-based Marketplaces are building "a single, consolidated system
to determine eligibility for exchange coverage, Medicaid or CHIP [the
Children's Health Insurance Program]., 393 These state-based Marketplaces
make final determinations about Medicaid and CHIP eligibility.394 Therefore, these quasi-public entities make determinations about access to important government benefits. And, consistent with the trend of increasing
privatization, state officials in several states expressed a desire to combine
Marketplace eligibility determinations with other public benefits programs,
such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, in order to maxim395
ize administrative efficiencies and improve applicant experiences.
But as Metzger points out, these efficiency and innovation goals are in
tension with accountability.396 There is no equivalent requirement for a single state agency to be accountable for the actions of the Marketplaces or
private contractors that administer Marketplace functions. Although federal
regulations seek to impose equivalent procedural and substantive constraints on the Marketplaces as are imposed on state Medicaid agencies, the
388.
389.

Id.
Id.

390.

See id. at 297.

391.
392.

Id. at 298.
See, e.g., K.C. ex rel. Africa v. Shipman, 716 F.3d 107, 112 (2013) (finding that

single state Medicaid agency and private insurance company are bound by federal Medicaid
requirements).
393. DASH ET AL., supra notel89, at 11.
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Metzger, supra note 386 at 295.
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rights may not be equivalent in practice because they may not be equally
enforceable through private litigation. Although Metzger proposes important changes to the constitutional private delegation doctrine, private actors must also be considered as acting "under color of state law" for the
purposes of § 1983 in order for constitutional, statutory, and hopefully
regulatory due process rights to be "independently enforceable."
The "under color of state law' inquiry is more complicated for the Marketplaces. This is because they are a variation on what administrative law
39
scholar, Anne Joseph O'Connell calls "boundary organizations. , 7
O'Connell catalogues boundary agencies that operate at the border of the
federal government and some other institution (states, private sector, or international).3 9 But, her theory is easily applicable to the state Marketplaces.
The Marketplaces are quintessentially boundary entities operating at the
state-private border, which makes the state action question more complicated. As O'Connell explains, current doctrine assumes a non-existent administrative state that only includes executive agencies and independent regulatory commissions.39 9 Because of the single state agency requirement, the
Medicaid program has mirrored this prototypical administrative state, and
therefore, Medicaid litigation has not seriously grappled with the problem
of privatization. 40 0 The Marketplaces, on the other hand, will raise questions
about whether boundary organizations performing similar functions as
Medicaid agencies will be held to the same constitutional and statutory obligations as the state agencies.
A brief analysis of Supreme Court precedent governing when private actors are subject to constitutional obligations shows that the doctrine is overly rigid and cannot capture the nuances of boundary organizations. The Supreme Court developed two lines of cases to determine whether an
organization on the private-public boundary has the same constitutional obligations as a government entity. 4° ' First, the Marketplaces might be considered governmental rather than private entities, in which case they would
be subject to the same constitutional obligations.4 2 Second, if the Market-

397.
Anne Joseph O'Connell, Bureaucracy at the Boundary, 162 U. PA. L. REv. 841,
847-48 (2014).
398. Id. at 855-69.
399. Id. at 852 (discussing the architecture of the bureaucracy and the legal implications
of boundary organizations).

400. 42 U.S.C. 1396 a(a)(5) (establishing the requirement that states designate a "single
state agency" to be responsible for administering the program. In K.C. ex rel. Africa v.
Shipman, 716 F.3d 107, 112 (4th Cir. 2013) the Fourth Circuit held that this requirement
continued to apply even when the state agency delegates authority to a private insurance

company to manage and administer beneficiaries' health insurance).
401.

Sotack v. Pa. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 104 F. Supp. 2d 471, 476 (E.D. Pa.

2000).
402.

See Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 392 (1995) (holding that
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places are deemed private entities, they might still be considered acting
"under color of state law" because their actions are state actions. 4 °' This can
occur when a private entity performs a traditionally public function, or
when there is a "close nexus" between the Marketplaces' actions and the
state power. 404
Although the two questions are related, they ultimately impose different
liabilities for private and governmental entities.40 5 The irony is that the state
action doctrine is treated as an "all-or-nothing" affair that creates "a brightline distinction" between actions that are deemed governmental and actions
considered purely private.40 6 This is because a boundary organization must
be conclusively categorized as either a government entity, in which case all
of its actions are state actions, or as a private entity, where its actions must
be analyzed in a piecemeal fashion.40 O'Connell's elucidation of the variety and complexity of boundary organizations calls this bright line approach
into question. 40 8 The blunt instrument results in significant inconsistencies
in the doctrine. These inconsistencies will only be exacerbated when evaluating the Marketplaces because each one has a slightly different governance
structure.
The Marketplaces provide an example of how this bright-line distinction
creates arbitrary results. Under the current doctrine, there is a relatively
strong argument that the Marketplaces are government entities. This means
that their actions would be considered government actions. But if the Marketplaces are categorized instead as private entities, it seems significantly
less likely that courts would attribute their actions to the state. This inconsistency only exists because the state action doctrine imagines a relatively
clean distinction between state actors and private entities. 40 9 However, because the Marketplaces exist on the border and do not fit cleanly into either
Amtrak is a government entity and is therefore liable for violating individuals' constitutional
rights).

403. Gillian E. Metzger, PrivatizationAs Delegation, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1367, 141516 (2003). See also Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352(1974) (citations
omitted) (defining public functions as those functions that are "traditionally the exclusive
prerogative of the State."); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1011-12 (1982) (citations omitted) (stating that privately owned enterprises, even though extensively regulated by the state
is not state action; programs undertaken by the state which results in substantial funding of
the activities of a private entity is not state action; and nursing homes do not perform a function that is "traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state" (quoting Jackson 419 U.S. at
352)).
404. See Metzger, supra note 403, at 1412.
405. Metzger, supra note 386 at 296.
406. Id.
407. Id.
408.
See O'Connell, supra note 397 at 855-63 (describing boundary organizations
across federal government and private sector and organizations on boundary of federal and
state government).
409. Id.
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category, the doctrine is ill-equipped to answer these questions. The remainder of this section attempts to analyze how the state-action doctrine
would apply to the various types of Marketplace structures and makes cautious predictions about how courts would resolve the thorny questions that
emerge.
1. Are the State-Based Marketplaces Governmental Entities?
The first question a court must address when deciding whether Marketplaces will be liable for violations of individuals' constitutional rights is
whether the Marketplaces are government or private entities. If considered
government entities, their actions would be presumptively considered governmental-no action-by-action analysis would be required. The non-profit
and quasi-governmental Marketplaces, despite not being state agencies,
might still be considered governmental entities for purposes of a § 1983 determination. Ten states and the District of Columbia use some form of quasi-governmental entity to run their Marketplace. 4 0 These Marketplaces
were all established by legislation, but vary significantly in their structure,
responsibilities, and powers. 4 1 Therefore, whether a Marketplace is a governmental entity will vary between states depending on the constellation of
authorities given to the Marketplaces.
Among the eleven Marketplaces that are loosely categorized as quasigovernmental entities, most are structured as an independent public entity
with a controlling governing board.412 Typically, the governor appoints the
governing board, with some states requiring legislative approval. 4 1 However, the status of these independent public entities varies significantly from
state to state. For example, Minnesota established their Marketplace as a
"board,, 414 which is defined as an "agency in the executive branch, other
than a department, whose primary purpose is to perform prescribed official
or representative functions. 415 Connecticut's law, on the other hand, states
that "[t]here is hereby created as a body politic and corporate, constituting a
public instrumentality and political subdivision of the state created for the
performance of an essential public and governmental function, to be known

410.
DASH ET AL., supra note 189, at 10 (California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Mexico, Oregon, Washington and the District of

Columbia established "quasi-governmental entities").
411.
412.
413.

See id. at 10, 23.
Id.
See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 100500(a)-(b) (West 2011); MD CODE ANN.,

INSURANCE

§ 31-104(b)(4), (g) (West 2014).;

WASH. REV. CODE ANN.

§ 43.71.020(1)-(3)

(West 2012).

414.
415.
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as the Connecticut Health Insurance Exchange. 4 16
Colorado and New Mexico decided to use a public nonprofit organization. 417 Colorado's law states that "[t]here is hereby created a nonprofit unincorporated public entity known as the health benefit exchange. The board
of directors shall govern the operation of the exchange." 418 But the statute
4 19
goes on the say that "the exchange is an instrumentality of the state.,
New Mexico, on the other hand, states that "[t]he 'New Mexico health insurance exchange' is created as a nonprofit public corporation," which is a
"governmental entity for purposes of the Tort Claims Act, and neither the
exchange nor the board shall be considered a governmental entity for any
other purpose.,

420

Hawaii chose to utilize a private non-profit organiza-

tion.421
Like New Mexico, several states specifically attempted to distinguish
their Marketplace from other state agencies. Hawaii made the greatest effort, stating: "[t]he connector shall not be an agency of the State and shall
not be subject to laws or rules regulating rulemaking, public employment,
or public procurement., 422 Colorado makes a similar declaration, specifying: "neither the exchange nor the board is an agency of the state. 423 Connecticut also states that "[t]he Connecticut Health Insurance Exchange shall
not be construed to be a department, institution or agency of the state. 11424
Likewise, Idaho explicitly characterizes the Marketplace as a non-agency:
"The exchange created by this chapter is not a state agency, shall not be
subject to the purchasing statutes and rules of the state of Idaho or subdivisions of the state. 425
Despite these states' best efforts, the test to determine whether an entity
is a governmental entity is not based on the statement of the legislation creating the entity, as the Supreme Court made clear in Lebron v. National
426

Railroad Passenger Corporation.

In Lebron, the Court held that even

though Congress declared that Amtrak was a private corporation, its declaration did not determine its governmental status for the purpose of enforc416.

417.
2013).

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

§ 38a-1081(a) (West 2014).

COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-22-104 (2014).; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59A-23F-3(A) (West

418.

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-22-104.

419.

Id.

420.

N.M. STAT. ANN.

§ 59A-23F-3(A).

421. HAW. REv. STAT. § 435H-2(a) (West 2014)("The connector shall be a Hawaii nonprofit corporation organized and governed pursuant to... the Hawaii nonprofit corporations
act.").
422. tit. 24, § 435H-2(a).
423.
424.
425.

COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-22-104 (West)
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-1081(a) (West).
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-6104(1)-(2) (West 2014).

426.

Lebronv. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 392 (1995).
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ing constitutional rights.42 Although Congress could disclaim "Amtrak's
status as a Government entity for purposes of matters that are within Congress's control-for example, whether it is subject to statutes ... such as
the Administrative Procedure Act," the test for whether Amtrak was a government entity for the purposes of enforcing constitutional rights turned on
the powers and functions it exercised. 42 To determine that Amtrak was
"part of the Government itself," the Court noted "Amtrak was created by a
special statute explicitly for the furtherance of federal governmental
goals. 429 It also highlighted the fact that most of the corporation's directors
are appointed directly by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate. 430 Relying on the fact that the corporation is organized under federal
law and under the direction and control of federal governmental appointees,
the Supreme Court concluded that "[i]t is in that respect no different from
the so-called independent regulatory agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission or the Securities Exchange Commission, which are
run by Presidential appointees with fixed terms.,, 4 1 The Lebron test has
been applied to state-created entities to determine whether a private entity
acted "under color of state law" for the purposes of § 1983.432 "As applied
to states and local governments, this means that it is power and control that
are crucial for governmental status purposes, and not what states and local
governments themselves say about the purportedly private status of their
creations .
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. Id. at 397.
430.
Id. Most of the corporation's directors, "six of the corporation's eight" are appointed. Id.
431. Id. at 398.
432.
See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 296
(2001) (invoking Lebron in a Fourteenth Amendment case); Horvath v. Westport Library
Ass'n, 362 F.3d 147, 153-54 (2d Cir. 2004) (applying Lebron to determine whether local
Library was a state actor for purposes of § 1983); see also Jorrnigan v. N.M. Mut. Cas. Co.,
No. CIV 03-0813 JB/ACT, 2004 WL 3426437, at *17 (D.N.M. April 19, 2004) (rejecting
argument that Lebron is limited to evaluating whether national corporations, rather than
state-created entities, are government actors); Sotack v. Pa. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n,
104 F.Supp.2d 471, 478-79 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (applying Lebron to the Pennsylvania Property
and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association, which is a mandatory association of all property and casualty insurance carriers that are authorized to write policies in Pennsylvania).
433.
Nahmod, 1 Civil Rights & Civil Liberties Litigation: The Law of Section 1983 §
2:5. There is some underlying tension in applying this test to state and local governments
for the purposes of enforcing § 1983. The reasoning in Lebron relies on the constitutional
nature of the right being enforced. 513 U.S. at 392. The Court stated that the statutory disclaimer of Amtrak's status "is assuredly dispositive of Amtrak's status as a Government entity for purposes of matters that are within Congress's control-for example, whether it is
subject to statutes that impose obligations or confer powers upon Government entities, such
as the Administrative Procedure Act." Id. However, congressional statements are, inherently,
not dispositive for constitutional rights and therefore, courts decide whether quasi-private
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Therefore, despite attempts by some state legislatures to distinguish the
state-based Marketplaces from state agencies, the test will turn on what
functions the Marketplaces perform and how much control state governments exert over the Marketplaces. There are many parallels between the
Marketplaces and Amtrak. First, like Amtrak, the Marketplaces are created
by statutes with the explicit goal of furthering important governmental
functions. In fact, several statutes explicitly acknowledge the public functions of the Marketplaces. For example, the Connecticut Marketplace was
"created for the performance of an essential public and governmental function. 434 Second, several Marketplaces claim to possess rulemaking authority, 43 5 though others are definitively deny rulemaking authority. 416 Whether a
Marketplace claims rulemaking authority has no correlation with whether
the state chose to structure its Marketplace as a state agency or declared it
independent from the state. For example, despite Hawaii's clear statement
that the Marketplace is not a state agency, the implementing legislation requires the governing board to "adopt rules to implement the provisions of
this chapter., 43 7 The ability to promulgate rules is clearly an exercise of
governmental authority, so it is curious that an entity explicitly distinguished from the state could exercise this kind of governmental authority.
Finally, like Amtrak, the Marketplaces' board members are almost all appointed by state governors, often requiring approval from the state legislature. 438 Therefore, under this test, the Marketplaces might simply be considered "government entities," rather than private entities contracting with the
government.

entities are subject to constitutional obligations.
Courts have unquestioningly shifted this test to the states when evaluating whether statebased quasi-private entities are subject to constitutional obligations under § 1983. See
Nahmod, 1 Civil Rights & Civil Liberties Litigation: The Law of Section 1983 § 2:5. But, §

1983 protects constitutional, statutory, and, this article argues should protect regulatory
rights. Courts do not seem to distinguish based on the source of the right when applying
Lebron to evaluate what is "under color of state law." See Nahmod, 1 Civil Rights & Civil
Liberties Litigation: The Law of Section 1983 § 2:5. The courts' approach seems to be the
logical conclusion of the Lebron reasoning. § 1983 is intended to protect federal rights, and
therefore states should not have the ability to exempt state-entities from federal-law obligations, even when those federal rights derive from non-constitutional sources.
434.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-1081(a) (West).
435.
DASH ET AL., supra note 166, at 10.
436.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-22-104 (West) ("The board does not have the authority to promulgate rules pursuant to the 'State Administrative Procedure Act', article 4 of
title 24, C.R.S.").
437.
HAW. REV. STAT. § 435H-10 (West 2014).
438.

See infra Appendix.
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2. Is there a Nexus Between the Actions of the Marketplaces and the State
Power?
Even if the Marketplaces are deemed not to be private entities, they
might still be "acting under color of state law" because their actions can be
attributed to the state. The Court's application of this doctrine "continues to
be beset by inconsistency and disagreement." 43 9 The main thrust of the inquiry is whether "there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and
the challenged action." 440 A sufficient nexus might exist if the private entity
is performing a "public function" or "state function," 441 where there is a
symbiotic relationship between the private action and the state,442 or where
the state requires, encourages, or is otherwise significantly involved in
nominally private conduct. 443
To evaluate whether a private entity's conduct is attributable to the state,
courts look at the nature of the action, rather than the nature of the entity. 4
The actions of the Marketplaces that this article is concerned about include
(1) determinations of eligibility for, and amount of, advance premium tax
credits," 5 and (2) eligibility assessments and determinations for Marketplace coverage and Medicaid. 446 At different times, the Supreme Court
adopted varying approaches to the public function test. 447 In some instances, the Court adopts a flexible, pragmatic approach, but in others the Court
has adopted a narrower, formalist approach.448 Metzger predicts that the

439. Metzger, supra note 403, at 1411.
440.
Id. at 1412 (quoting Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 52 (1999)).
The Court has used various tests and formulations to determine when private action is attributable to the state. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961) (quoting United States

v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)), and has admitted that these cases "have not been a
model of consistency."

Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632 (1991)

(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
441.
See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506-07 (1946) (dictum) (providing examples
of owners of privately held bridges, ferries, turnpikes and railroads and a corporations use of
a four lane highway that discriminates against interstate commerce); Smith v. Allwright, 321
U.S. 649, 660-61 (1944) (discussing the exclusion of African-Americans to vote in state
primary elections).
442.
See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 721-22 (1961).
443.
Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963) (Declaring decisions enforced by the

executive, absent legislative action, to constitute "state action"; Id.(Douglas, J., Concurring)
(stating executive, legislative ,and judicial enforcement of racial segregation to constitute

"state actiof').
444. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1005 (1982) ("the required nexus may be present
if the private entity has exercised powers that are traditionally the exclusive prerogative of

the State").
445. 42 U.S.C.A. § 18082.
446.
42 U.S.C.A. § 18081(f)(1)(A)-(B); 45 C.F.R. § 155.405 (West, WestlawNext
through Nov. 6, 2014; 79 FR 66265).
447. Metzger, supra note 403, at 1412.

448.
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formalist approach will win out with the result that "privatization is likely
to result in a denial of state action., 449 The Court's narrow approach to the
public function test limits finding state action to areas that are "traditionally
and exclusively performed by the government. 450 The Court defined this as
limited not only to services that governments have historically provided but
also services "that the government is required to provide directly., 451 Under
this narrow approach, the Supreme Court made clear in Blum v. Yaretsky
that Medicaid benefits do not fall within this category because states are not
constitutionally obligated to provide the benefits.452 Therefore, the Court
refused to find "state action" in the nursing homes' decisions to discharge
or transfer Medicaid patients to lower levels of care.453
Given this narrow interpretation of the public function test, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court will find a private Marketplace's determination or assessment of eligibility for Medicaid or Marketplace coverage to be
a public function, since neither is constitutionally required. However, the
tax credits are a much closer question. It is unclear what level of abstraction
the Court will use to analyze the tax credits. Collecting taxes is an exclusively government function, and viewed in this light, the Marketplace's role
in calculating a tax credit amount seems to be a "public function." However, a more specific description of the function is that the Marketplaces are

tion decisions occurring at the height of the civil rights struggle. Faced with concerted efforts to preserve racial segregation by transferring responsibilities to private hands, the Court
took an expansive view of when private acts triggered constitutional protections. But as state
action issues began to surface in administrative contexts and involve procedural due process
claims, the Court became significantly more unwilling to find state action and hold private
individuals to constitutional requirements. Correspondingly, it began to engage in a far more

formalistic analysis.").
449. Id. at 1415.
450.
Id.; see also Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352 (defining public functions as those functions that are "traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State").
451. Metzger, supra note 403, at 1416; see also Blum, 457 U.S at 1011-12 (Finding
that "nursing homes do not perform a function that has been 'traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State' (quoting Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353)).
452. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1011-12.
453.

Id at 1012. This holding essentially prevents suing the state Medicaid agency for

the nursing homes' medical decision to discharge the patients to a lower level of care. Id.
This is a distinct fact pattern from the Medicaid litigation challenging benefit denials, for
example under EPSDT. In those cases, the medical provider has prescribed a certain treat-

ment and the state Medicaid agency, or private managed care company, refuses to cover it.
See generally Jane Perkins, Medicaid EPSDT Case Developments, NAT'L HEALTH L.
PROGRAM
1-2
(July 2007),
http://www.healthlaw.org/about/staff/jane-perkins/allpublications/epsdt-cases#VBhZj2RdXbw (listing cases). Therefore, Blum v. Yaretsky does

not call into question the beneficiaries' ability to challenge benefit denials made by private
insurers with whom the state has contracted to provide the Medicaid insurance. Blum, 457
U.S.; See also Metzger, supra note 403, at 1420 n.85 (highlighting that managed care organizations in Medicaid and Medicare are an exception to the general trend against finding state
action).
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providing an estimate of each applicant's future tax liability.45 4 That is, because the advance premium tax credits are calculated based on predicted
future income, and the IRS still has the ultimate authority over tax liability
at the end of the year,455 the advance nature of the premium tax credits
might remove the Marketplace function from the category of exclusive
government functions. Furthermore, if the function is defined more specifically (i.e. "tax credits to subsidize private health insurance premiums" rather than "tax collection"), courts may determine that the tax credits are not
a service the government is obligated to provide directly.456
In sum, although it is likely to be a highly contested claim, there is a
strong argument that state-based Marketplaces, even those nominally established as private entities, will still be considered acting "under color of state
law" and therefore subject to § 1983 litigation.
V. CONCLUSION

Medicaid quietly emerged as the new centerpiece of § 1983 litigation.45
This litigation has played an important role in shaping Medicaid policy
throughout the country, both through a network of district court injunctions
and consent decrees, but also by inspiring state legislation modeled on earlier litigation outcomes.458 Part of the success of Medicaid litigation is due
to the fact that state Medicaid agencies and the federal Medicaid law fit
more squarely within the existing doctrine governing § 1983. 459 Medicaid is
administered by prototypical state agencies whose officials clearly act "under color of state law" for the purposes of § 1983.460 Furthermore, at least
some provisions of the federal statute utilize explicit "rights creating language" as required after Gonzaga.4 6 However, the newly created Health
Insurance Marketplaces will push the boundaries of several important doctrines that Medicaid litigants often relied on. The procedural due process
protections are contained exclusively in regulations rather than statutes,
challenging the scope of § 1983's protection.462 The Marketplaces themselves vary from part of a federal agency to federal-state hybrids to organi454.
42 U.S.C. § 18082 (2012 & Supp. I 2013) (discussing "advance" determinations).
See, e.g., U,S. Ctrs for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Application for Health Coverage &
Help Paying Costs, HEALTHCARE.GOV passim (September 2014), http://marketplace
.cms.gov/applications-and-forms/marketplace-application-for-family.pdf.
455.
See 26 U.S.C. § 36B(f) (2012 & Supp. 1 2013) (describing reconciliation process if
predicted income differs from actual income).
456.
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1011-12 (1982).
457.
See supra Part II.A.
458.
See id.
459.
See supra Part II.B.
460.
See supra Part IV.C.
461.
See supra Part IV.A.
462.
See id.; see supra Part IV. B, pp 50-54.
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zations on the boundary between the state and the private sector.463
This article argued that the current law of § 1983 is too rigid to accommodate the new, complex, and divided authority of the Health Insurance
Marketplaces and will create an arbitrary gap between the availability of
private enforcement against Medicaid agencies and the availability of private enforcement against the Marketplaces.464 In the context of a complex
regime administered largely by a federal agency, courts should recognize
the more nuanced relationships that exist between federal agencies, state
officials, and beneficiaries by recognizing delegations of rights-making authority to agencies for the purposes of § 1983. Clinging to the rigid doctrine
of the status quo threatens the demise of private enforcement in our increasingly complex healthcare landscape.

463.
464.

See supra Part IV.
See supra Part IV.
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APPENDIX

State

Enacting
Law

Status 465

Enacting Language

CA

Cal. Gov't
Code
§ 100500

Quasigovernmental

"There is in state government
the California Health Benefit
Exchange,an independent
public entity not affiliated
with an agency or department,
which shall be known as the
Exchange." Cal. Gov't Code
§ 100500(a).

Language disclaiming
governmental status

Rulemaking
authority?466
Yes 4 67

Language
declaring a
public function

Government Appoints
board members?
Total Members: 5
5 voting
*
0 non-voting
*

Governor Appointed: 2
Other appointments:
*

1 by the Senate
Committee on Rules,

*

1 by the Speaker of
the Assembly.

Cal. Gov't Code
§ 100500(a)

CO

Colo. Rev.
Stat. Ann.
§ 10-22104

465

Quasigovernmental

Status description taken from

COMMONWEALTH FUND 10

"There is hereby created a
nonprofit unincorporated public entity known as the health
benefit exchange."

"The exchange is an instrumentality of the state; except that the debts and liabilities of the exchange do
not constitute the debts and
liabilities of the state, and

No 46 8

Total Members: 12
9 voting
*
3 non-voting
*

Governor Appointed: 5

SARAH DASH ET AL., IMPLEMENTING THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: KEY DESIGN DECISIONS FOR STATE-BASED EXCHANGES,

(2013), availableat

http://www.commonwealthfund.org/-/media/Files/Publications/Fund%2Report/2013/Jul/1696-Dash key-design-decisions-state based-exchanges.pdf.
466 Rulemaking authority taken from Dash et al., supra note 1. Where applicable, additional citations to state statute granting rulemaking authority are listed.
467 Cal. Gov't Code § 100504(a)(6) ("the board may do the following: ...Adopt rules and regulations, as necessary.").
468 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 10-22-104 ("The board does not have the authority to promulgate rules pursuant to the "State Administrative Procedure Act", article 4 of title 24, C.R.S.").
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neither the exchange nor the
board is an agency of the
state."

Other Appointments:
*
1 by the President of
the Senate
*

1 by the Minority
leader of the Senate

*

1 by the Speaker of
the House of Representatives

*

1 by the Minority
Leader of the House
of Representatives.

Colo. Rev. Star. Ann.
§ 10-22-105
Conn.
Gen. Stat.
Ann.
§ 38a1081

469

Quasigovernmental

"There is hereby created as a
body politic and corporate,
constituting a public instrumentality and political subdivision of the state created for
the performance of an essential public and governmental
function, to be known as the
Connecticut Health Insurance
Exchange." § 38a-1081(a)

"The Connecticut Health
Insurance Exchange shall
not be construed to be a department, institution or
agency of the state." § 38a1081 (a)

Total members: 14469
*
11 voting
*
3 non-voting
Governor appointed: 2
Other appointments:
*
1 by the President
Pro Tempore of the
Senate
*

1 by the speaker of
the House of Representatives

*

1 by the Majority

Reflects the Board composition after June 19, 2013. See 3 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 38a-1081(b)(1)(B). Initial composition of the Board is located at

Conn. Gen. Star. Ann. § 38a-1081(b)(1)(A).
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Leader of the Senate
*

1 by the Majority
Leader of the House
of Representatives

*

1 by the Minority
Leader of the Senate

*

1 by the Minority
Leader of the House
of Representatives

Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 38a-1081(b)(1)(B)
DC

D.C. Code
§ 31-3171
et seq.

Quasigovernmental

"There is established, as an
independent authority of the
District government, the District of Columbia Health Benefit Exchange Authority."
D.C. Code § 31-3171.02

HI

Haw. Rev.
Stat.
§ 435H-2

470

Private nonprofit

"There is established the Hawaii health insurance exchange to be known as the
Hawaii health connector...
The connector shall be a Hawaii nonprofit corporation organized and governed pursuant to chapter 414D, the
Hawaii nonprofit corporations
act."

"The Authority shall be an
instrumentality, created to
effectuate the purposes stated in this chapter, that shall
have a legal existence separate from the District govermnent."
D.C.Code § 31-3171.02

4
Yes/

"The connector shall not be
an agency of the State and
shall not be subject to laws
or rules regulating rulemaking, public employment, or
public procurement.... The
debts and liabilities of the
connector shall not constitute the debts and liabilities
of the State." § 435H-2(a)

Yes

Total Members: 11
7 voting
*
4 non-voting
*

Mayor Appointed: 7
D.C. Code § 31-3171.05

Total Members: 15
9 voting
*
5 non-voting
*

Other information:
"For each vacant position
on the board, the board,
speaker of the house of
representatives, and the
president of the senate

D.C. Code § 31-3171.17 ("The Authority, pursuant to subchapter I of Chapter 5 of Title 2 shall issue rules to implement the provisions of this chapter.").
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§ 435H-2(a)

shall each submit to the
governor the names of
two qualified nominees.
The governor shall appoint members of the
board"
Haw. Rev. Star. § 435H4(b)

Idaho
Code
Ann. § 416104

Quasigovernmental

"There is hereby created an
independent body corporate
and politic to be known as the
"Idaho Health Insurance Exchange."
§ 41-6104(1)

"The exchange created by
this chapter is not a state
agency, shall not be subject
to the purchasing statutes
and rules of the state of Idaho or subdivisions of the
state" § 41-6104(2)

Exercise of au-

thority "shall be
deemed and
held to be the
performance of
an essential
public function."
§ 41-6104(1)

Total Members: 19
*
17 voting
*
2 non-voting
Other information:
"The fourteen (14) voting
members who are not
members of the legislature shall be appointed to
the board by, and serve at
the pleasure of, the governor. The members appointed to the board by
the governor shall be subject to confirmation by the
senate, provided that, upon appointment, board
members shall have full
authority to exercise all
the rights and duties, and
participate in all decisions, required of the position."
Idaho Code Ann. § 416104(3)
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KY

Executive
Order
2012587471

Existing State
agency

Office of the Kentucky Health
Benefit Exchange is hereby
created and established within
the Cabinet for Health and
Family Services

N/A (state agency)

Yes

MD

MD Insurance §
31-101 et
seq.

Quasigovernmental
entity

The Exchange is a body politic
and corporate and is an instrumentality of the State.
The Exchange is a public corporation and a unit of State
government,
(§ 31-102(b)(1)-(2))

N/A - subject to several obligations of state actors, including State APA (§ 31103)

Yes472

Executive Director appointed by the Governor
Executive Order 2012587

The exercise by
the Exchange of
its authority under this title is
an essential
governmental
function.
(§ 31102(b)(3))

Total Members: 9
9 voting
*
0 non-voting
*

Governor Appointed: 6
Other information:
3 heads of agencies
MD Insurance § 31104(b)(4)

MA

Mass.
Gen.
Laws.
Ann. ch.
176Q § 1
et seq.

Quasigovernmental

"There shall be a body politic
and corporate and a public instrumentality to be known as
the commonwealth health insurance connector authority,
which shall be an independent
public entity not subject to the
supervision and control of any
other executive office, department, commission, board,
bureau, agency or political
subdivision of the commonwealth

-

Yes473

Total Members: 11
11 voting
*
0 non-voting
*

Governor Appointed: 4
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch.
176Q, § 2(b)

471 A copy of the Executive Order is available at: http://apps.sos.ky.gov/Executive/Journal/execjournalimages/2012-MISC-2012-0587-222943.pdf.

MD Insurance § 31-106(c)(1)(iv): subject to paragraph (2) of this subsection, adopt regulations to carry out this title: 1. in accordance with Title 10, Subtitle 1 of the State Government Article; and 2. without conflicting with or preventing application of regulations adopted by the Secretary under Title 1, Subtitle D
of the Affordable Care Act.
471 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. 176Q § 16 ("The connector may adopt regulations to implement this chapter.").
472

Published by LAW eCommons, 2015

69

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 24 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 5

2015

Holding Health Insurance MarketplacesAccountable
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. chi.
176Q § 2
Minn.
Stat. Ann.
§ 62V.03

Quasigovernmental

"MNsure is created as a board
under section 15.012, 474 paragraph (a)," § 62V.03

Yes 4 75

"(h) A MNsure decision that
requires a vote of the board,
other than a decision that applies only to hiring of employees or other internal management of MNsure, is an
"administrative action" under section 10A.01, subdivision 2." § 62V.03(h)
NV

N.R.S.
6951 et
seq.

New State
agency

"The Silver State Health Insurance Exchange is hereby
established"
N.R.S. § 6951.200

Total Members: 7
*
7 voting
*
0 non-voting
Governor Appointed: 6
with the advice and
*
consent of both the
senate and house of
representatives
Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 62V.04

Yes 476

Total Members: 10
7 voting
*
3 non-voting
*

Governor appointed: 5
Other appointments:
*
1 by Senate Majority
Leader
*

1 by Speaker of the
Assembly

Section 15.012 designates state agencies by type. MNsure is designated as An agency in the executive branch, other than a department, whose primary
purpose is to perform prescribed official or representative functions shall be designated a "board." To be classified as a board, an agency must have at least one
of the following powers: (i) the power to perform administrative acts, which may include the expenditure of state money, (ii) the power to issue and revoke licenses or certifications, (iii) the power to make rules, or (iv) the power to adjudicate contested cases or appeals." Minn. Stat. Ann. § 15.012(a).
475 Minn. Stat. Ann. § 62V.05(a) ("If the board's policies, procedures, or other statements are rules, as defined in section 14.02, subdivision 4, the requirements in either paragraph (b) or (c) apply, as applicable.").
476
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 6951.370(2)(a) ("The Board may: Adopt regulations to carry out the duties and powers of the Exchange").
474
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N.R.S. § 6951.300

i

i

N.M. Stat.
Ann. §
59A-23F3

Quasigovernmental

4

"The "New Mexico health insurance exchange" is created
as a nonprofit public corporation" § 59A-23F-3(A)

i

"The exchange is a governmental entity for purposes
of the Tort Claims Act, and
neither the exchange nor the
board shall be considered a
governmental entity for any
other purpose."
§ 59A-23F-3(A)

i

Total Members: 13
*
13 voting
*
0 non-voting
Governor Appointed: 6
Other appointments:
*

3 by President Pro
Tempore of the Senate

*

3 by Speaker of the
House of Representatives

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59A23F-3(E)
NY

N.Y. Executive
Order, No.
42. (Apr.
12,

Existing State
agency

2012) 4 77

477

"There is hereby established
within the Department of
Health, in conformity with the
Affordable Care Act, the New
York Health Benefit Exchange... The Department of
Health, in conjunction with the
Department of Financial Services and other state agencies,
shall take all necessary steps
to effectuate the Exchange."

Yes

N/A - no governing board

Executive Order No. 12-42 (2012) availableat http://www.governor.ny.gov/press/04122012-EO-42.
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OR

O.R.S.
§ 741 et
seq.

Quasigovernmental

Yes4 78

"The Oregon Health Insurance
Exchange Corporation is established as a public corporation performing governmental
functions and exercising governmental powers."
O.R.S § 741.001(1)

Total Members: 9
7 voting
*
2 non-voting
.

Governor appointed: 7
subject to confirmation by the Senate

*

O.R.S. § 741.025(1)
RI

Executive
Order 1109, Sept.
19,
201 1479

Existing State
agency

"There is hereby established a
Division within the Executive
Department, which shall be
known as the Rhode Island
Health Benefit Exchange...
to meet the purposes of administering the Fund." (1)(b).

Yes 480

Total Members: 13
voting members unspecified

*

Governor Appointed: 9
Executive Order 11-09,
Sept. 19, 2011, 4.
481

UT

Utah Code
Ann.
§ 63M-12504

471
479
480

Existing state
agency

"There is created within the
Governor's Office of Economic Development the Office of
Consumer Health Services"
§ 63M-1-2504(1)

-

No 4

-

N/a no governing board

Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 741.002(6) ("The corporation may adopt rules necessary to carry out its mission, duties and functions.").
A copy of the executive order is available at http://www.healthcare.ri.gov/publications/ (under heading "Other Resources").
Executive Order 11-09(18) ("Pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws § 23-1-17, the Health Director shall promulgate regulations governing the establish-

ment and operation of the RIHBE.").
481 Utah Code Ann. § 63M-1-2504(5)(ii) ("The office may not.., adopt administrative rules, except as provided in Section 63M-1-2506") Section 63M-12506(1)(a) directs the office to "adopt administrative rules... that establish uniform electronic standards for insurers, employers, brokers, consumers, and vendors to use when transmitting or receiving information, uniform applications, waivers of coverage, or payments to, or from, the Health Insurance Exchange."
Utah Code Ann. § 63M-1-2506(1)(a).
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§ 1803

i.

Wash.
Rev. Code
Ann.
§ 43.71.02
0

i

Existing state
agency

"The Department of Vermont
Health Access shall establish
the Vermont Health Benefit
Exchange, which shall be administered by the Department
in consultation with the Advisory Committee established
in section 402 of this title The
Vermont Health Benefit Exchange shall be considered a
division within the Department of Vermont Health Access and shall be headed by a
Deputy Commissioner"
33 V.S.A. § 1803(a)(1)-(2)

Quasigovernmental

"a self-sustaining publicprivate partnership separate
and distinct from the state,"

Annals of Health Law

i_

"separate and distinct from
the state"

Yes-

i __

_

N/A no governing board.

__

_

_

i

_

_

_

_

Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 43.71.020

_

i__

__

_

__

Total Members: 11
*
9 voting4 3
*
2 non-voting
Governor Appointed: 9
Other information:
Legislature provides nominees to Governor who
appoints 8 voting members from the list
Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 43.71.020(1).

482

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 1810 ("The Secretary of Human Services may adopt rules pursuant to 3 V.S.A. chapter 25 as needed to carry out the duties and

functions established in this subchapter.").
483 Ninth voting member is the Chair of the Board, who only votes in the event of a tie. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 43.71.020(1)(c).
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